fix(beads): allow /var/tmp in repo-context safety boundary (#5028)
* fix(beads): be-odye4 allow /var/tmp in repo-context safety boundary isPathInSafeBoundary() rejected any beads dir under /var/tmp, but this host's go shim sets GOTMPDIR=/var/tmp/gotmp for build-like subcommands when unset, and Go's t.TempDir() roots under GOTMPDIR when set (even though os.TempDir() itself still reports /tmp). That left the existing os.TempDir()-based carve-out unable to match, so any test resolving a repo context under a fresh t.TempDir() in this sandbox tripped the "unsafe location" check. Add a /var/tmp carve-out using the same symlink-safe resolution as the existing /Users/Shared carve-out, since /var/tmp is equally world-writable. General FHS-standard fix, not sandbox-specific. Diagnosed alongside the cmd/bd 3-minute timeout panic (contention, not a hang -- no code fix needed there, see bead notes) and two unrelated env-leak bugs split out separately (be-3b1fn, be-0vags). * fix(beads): admit physical OS temp roots safely (mybd-nazg) Recognize both lexical and canonical OS temp-root spellings before applying resolvedPathWithinRoot as the final symlink-safe containment check. This restores the production hunk dropped while merging #5044, preserves #5030's escape hardening, and keeps #5028's /var/tmp carve-out. Agent-Signature: codex-gpt-5.6-sol-xhigh on behalf of maphew --------- Co-authored-by: matt wilkie <maphew@gmail.com>
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2 changed files with 52 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -333,6 +333,18 @@ func isPathInSafeBoundary(path string) bool {
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return true
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}
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// Allow /var/tmp as the FHS-standard secondary temp directory (persists across
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// reboots, unlike /tmp). This is distinct from the os.TempDir() carve-out
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// above: a machine's build tooling can set GOTMPDIR to redirect Go's own
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// test/compile temp dirs under /var/tmp even while os.TempDir() itself still
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// reports /tmp, so t.TempDir() in a test binary can land here without the
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// os.TempDir() check ever seeing it (be-odye4). Like /Users/Shared, /var/tmp is
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// world-writable (drwxrwxrwt), so resolve symlinks before admitting (SEC-003):
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// a symlink planted under it must not be followed into a rejected directory.
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if absPath == "/var/tmp" || strings.HasPrefix(absPath, "/var/tmp/") {
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return resolvedPathWithinRoot(absPath, "/var/tmp")
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}
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for _, prefix := range unsafePrefixes {
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if strings.HasPrefix(absPath, prefix+"/") || absPath == prefix {
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return false
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@ -390,6 +390,15 @@ func TestIsPathInSafeBoundary(t *testing.T) {
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// user's home — it must be accepted (be-vc1 / SEC-003 carve-out).
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{"macOS shared subdir", "/Users/Shared/portharbour/.beads", true},
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{"macOS shared root", "/Users/Shared", true},
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// /var/tmp is the FHS-standard secondary temp directory (persists across
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// reboots, unlike /tmp) and must be accepted despite matching the /var
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// unsafePrefixes entry above. Go's own test/build tooling can root
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// GOTMPDIR-influenced temp dirs here even when os.TempDir() itself still
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// reports /tmp, so the os.TempDir()-based carve-out above doesn't cover it
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// (be-odye4).
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{"var/tmp root", "/var/tmp", true},
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{"var/tmp GOTMPDIR-style subdir", "/var/tmp/gotmp/TestSomething1234/001/.beads", true},
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}
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for _, tt := range tests {
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@ -484,6 +493,37 @@ func TestIsPathInSafeBoundary_SharedSymlinkEscape(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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// TestIsPathInSafeBoundary_VarTmpSymlinkEscape proves the /var/tmp carve-out
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// (be-odye4) applies the same symlink-safe resolution as /Users/Shared: /var/tmp
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// is world-writable (drwxrwxrwt) on Linux/BSD, so a co-located user could plant a
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// symlink under it whose target escapes to a rejected system directory. Skipped
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// when /var/tmp is absent or not writable, so it never fails spuriously.
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func TestIsPathInSafeBoundary_VarTmpSymlinkEscape(t *testing.T) {
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const varTmp = "/var/tmp"
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if info, err := os.Stat(varTmp); err != nil || !info.IsDir() {
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t.Skipf("%s not present as a directory: %v", varTmp, err)
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}
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link := filepath.Join(varTmp, fmt.Sprintf(".be-odye4-escape-test-%d", os.Getpid()))
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_ = os.Remove(link)
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if err := os.Symlink("/etc", link); err != nil {
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t.Skipf("cannot create symlink in %s (not writable?): %v", varTmp, err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Remove(link) })
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// A BEADS_DIR routed *through* the escaping symlink must be rejected: its bytes
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// resolve into /etc, outside /var/tmp.
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target := filepath.Join(link, ".beads")
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if isPathInSafeBoundary(target) {
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t.Errorf("isPathInSafeBoundary(%q) = true, want false (path through symlink escaping /var/tmp to /etc)", target)
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}
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// The escaping symlink itself also resolves outside the boundary.
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if isPathInSafeBoundary(link) {
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t.Errorf("isPathInSafeBoundary(%q) = true, want false (symlink under /var/tmp escaping to /etc)", link)
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}
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}
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// TestIsPathInSafeBoundary_TempDirSymlinkEscape mirrors
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// TestIsPathInSafeBoundary_SharedSymlinkEscape for the os.TempDir() carve-out
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// (be-kghzr SEC-003 hardening). Unlike /Users/Shared, os.TempDir() is
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