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Author SHA1 Message Date
Julian Knutsen
2c06c76b51
Publish PUT and DELETE /v0/beads/config/{key}, the write half of issueops.WorkspaceConfig (ga-098zm) (#5596)
* Publish PUT and DELETE /v0/beads/config/{key}, the write half of issueops.WorkspaceConfig (ga-098zm)

Settings are read-only over v0: `WorkspaceConfig.SetSetting` and `UnsetSetting`
have no wire operation, which leaves the infra-over-http surface able to see that
a workspace is configured and unable to configure it. These are those operations.
The role, its contract and all three legs already exist; this slice wires them.

Spec first, then `make api-gen`, then the handlers.

PUT AND DELETE ON THE KEY'S OWN PATH, and the methods ARE the argument rather
than a preference. The resource has a canonical URI, the caller names it, and the
request carries the value that becomes its whole state — that is what PUT already
means, and the write is idempotent in the strict sense. `POST /v0/beads/memories`
is the operation this is deliberately NOT: that one posts to the COLLECTION
because its key may be derived from the content, so the caller cannot always name
the resource it is creating. Here it always can. The removal is
`DELETE /v0/beads/memories/{key}`'s shape unchanged — one named resource, no body,
no flags — and all three rows share one pattern, differing only in method, which
ServeMux registers together.

THE KEY IS THE PATH'S AND APPEARS NOWHERE IN THE BODY, so `SetSettingRequest`
carries exactly one member. A body spelling the anchor a second time is one
request with two anchors and a question about what to do when they disagree; the
parity test asserts the absence from both sides.

## The redaction doctrine, and what the write half owes it

A KEY WHOSE NAME MARKS IT CREDENTIAL-BEARING IS WRITABLE, resolved from the
facade's actual behavior rather than from the shape of the read. `ValidateSettingWrite`
refuses an empty key, `issue_prefix` in either spelling, and a `status.custom`
that does not parse — and nothing else; `config.IsSecretKey` appears nowhere in
the write path. The CLI's own secret guard is `CheckSecretKeyGitSafety`, which is
gated on `IsYamlOnlyKey` and protects a git-tracked **config.yaml** — a different
plane with a different hazard, a credential in git history — and returns clean for
every key this operation reaches. The role states the asymmetry itself: the reads
are a firewall, the writes are not, and a write discloses nothing. Refusing here
would be a refusal the role does not have, invented by the projection, and it
would leave a workspace's credentials visible as PRESENT and permanently
unconfigurable through this door.

WHAT THE WIRE OWES INSTEAD IS THE RESPONSE. Redaction is caller-independent and
decided on the KEY, and `Setting.value` says in one place that a `redacted: true`
entry withholds a value that may well be stored — so a write answering with both
would make one schema mean two different things depending on which operation
produced it. The write is therefore projected by `wireSetting`, the SAME function
the read is projected by, and the test states that as an equality rather than as
two assertions that could drift: the body of a PUT is byte-for-byte the body of
the GET that follows it. It costs the caller nothing, because the role promises
the stored value equals the value sent for every key this plane accepts, so the
echo carries no information the caller does not already hold.

The removal publishes `key` and nothing else. No `removed` flag — the storage seam
discards the affected-row count on all three legs, so the member would be a value
one of them had to invent — and no `value`, which on the one settings operation
that withholds nothing would publish exactly the credential the read redacts.

## Absent-vs-empty, and the 404 that is not here

REMOVING A KEY NOTHING SET SUCCEEDS. This is where the operation parts company
with the memory delete it otherwise copies: that role reports Found, and `bd recall`
already has an exit-code contract for the miss. This one cannot — an absent key
and a key stored as the empty string are one answer on this plane, the same
conflation `GET /v0/beads/config/{key}` has no 404 for — so the operation states
an intended END STATE, and the same request twice is 200 and then 200. The
document also records what the removal does NOT undo: `status.custom`'s
projection survives the row it came from, on all three implementations
(bd-yby99.33), as does the protected key's write-refused/remove-permitted
asymmetry (bd-yby99.34).

The empty string is a legal VALUE and is stored, not read as a removal: a caller
that meant "remove it" has DELETE, and conflating the two would make one request
mean whichever the handler guessed.

## The one bound that is the write's alone

`config.key` is VARCHAR(255) and the PUT INSERTS into it, so an over-long key is
an error from the column — a 500 for a request the caller could have fixed. The
GET and the DELETE COMPARE the same value and never store it, so a key no column
could hold matches nothing and already has an answer, and refusing it there would
be a refusal the role does not have. That is `releaseExpectedAssignee`'s rule
applied to the other keyed plane, and the asymmetry is asserted in both
directions.

THE ROLE'S 400 CARRIES NO `param`, and that is the depguard rule doing its job
rather than a shortcut. Two of the role's refusals are reachable and they name
different members — the protected key, and a value that does not parse — and
telling them apart takes the role's protected-key VOCABULARY, which this package
cannot hold: `httpapi-transport-boundary` denies internal/workapi from every
non-test file here, precisely so a second copy of a shared rule cannot exist to
drift. `detail` carries the role's own sentence, which names what to send instead;
every refusal this handler owns names its member.

ONE STALE SENTENCE FIXED ON THIS SURFACE. `listSettings` justified redaction with
"this API has no authentication", which stopped being true when #5516 landed the
optional bearer and which #5545 rewrote everywhere except here; settings.go's file
comment carried the same sentence. Both now say what is actually load-bearing — a
configured bearer is a single shared token that decides WHO may call and never
what a caller who is let in may read — which is the statement this whole slice
depends on. `forgetMemory`'s description carries the same staleness and is left
for that surface's own change.

CENSUS +1 EACH, twice over: two spec paths on one existing path item;
SetSettingRequest and RemovedSetting; the document's no-query-parameter list and
its two counts; two route rows on the pattern the read already registers; two
capability tokens in the ContextResponse prose (the only hand edit — Capabilities()
is derived); OpSetSetting and OpUnsetSetting; two operationCodes rows
(getSetting's vocabulary, no code minted). NOTHING new in the role plumbing:
Config.Settings, sourceRoles, roleSourceNames and s.workspaceConfig() already
carry this role, and the hook decorator's WorkspaceConfig accessor deliberately
wraps nothing — the workspace hook vocabulary hands a script an ISSUE, and a
settings write has none to name, so there is no RoleFiresHooks case to add.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Bound the settings value at the edge, and pin PUT's idempotence and the no-leak in bytes

Review found this branch shipping the exact hazard its own key bound was written
to prevent, plus two properties driven live and pinned by nothing.

## `config.value` had no bound, and it is a TEXT column

`settingWriteKey` refuses an over-long KEY with a 400 naming the member, and the
comment on it says why: an over-long key would be "a 500 for a request the caller
could have fixed". The VALUE beside it had no such check and lands in a `TEXT`
column. Measured before the fix: a 100 KiB `PUT` is a generic 500 out of the
column — the one code that tells the caller nothing about how to fix it — on the
same operation, in the same PR.

Bounded at the edge, keyed on a storage constant rather than a literal, refusing
with `param: "value"` before the role is asked.

BYTES, NOT CHARACTERS, which is why this is `types.CheckTextLen` beside
`CheckFieldLen` rather than the same helper with a bigger number: MySQL and Dolt
bound a TEXT column by ENCODED length, so 40000 two-byte characters overflow it
while 65000 ASCII ones do not. A rune-counting bound would have accepted the
former and handed the 500 back. Both directions are pinned — exactly
`MaxTextBytes` is accepted and reaches the role, one byte more is refused, and
the multi-byte case is its own test — and all three mutations (bound removed,
runes instead of bytes, one byte too strict) fail it.

NOT WIDENED, deliberately, and this is the opposite call from the ephemeral
comment column in the commit before it. A comment is a DOCUMENT — a stack trace,
a diff, a transcript — and the two comment planes disagreeing about one was a
bug. A setting is a VALUE: nothing this plane holds is a megabyte of
configuration, so the narrow bound is the honest description of what a settings
row is for rather than a limitation to widen later. The spec now states the
number and the contrast instead of claiming the 1 MiB body cap is the only limit.

## Two properties that were driven live and pinned by nothing

PUT'S IDEMPOTENCE. The method's whole argument is that the same request twice
leaves the same row, and the E2E exercised it while no test asserted it. Now
pinned on both halves: the second response is byte-for-byte the first, and BOTH
calls reach the role — the second half matters because the role performs its
write and its projection unconditionally (a no-op detection would make repairing
a drifted table depend on the row having changed, which is the state that needs
repairing), so this surface must not short-circuit either. Verified with a
compiling short-circuit mutation, which the "want 2" assertion catches.

THE NO-LEAK GREP NOW READS RAW RESPONSE BYTES rather than the decoded map. The
integration test already greps marshaled JSON; the unit test was checking members
it had thought to name, which an extension member, a duplicated key or an echo
inside a `detail` string would all walk past. Demonstrated: a mutation that adds
a `stored_preview` member carrying the credential passes every member assertion
in that test and is caught only by the byte grep — which is also what a client, a
proxy log and an access log actually receive.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 19:47:21 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
cc3d0bcf3c
Publish POST /v0/beads/issues/{id}/comments, the wire half of issueops.Commenter (ga-rslox) (#5594)
* Publish POST /v0/beads/issues/{id}/comments, the wire half of issueops.Commenter (ga-rslox)

The commenter is one of the facade roles the ext-api-store audit lists with no
wire operation, and comment READS already ride `getIssue?include_comments=true`.
This is the write. The role, its contract and all three legs already exist; this
slice wires them.

Spec first, then `make api-gen`, then the handler.

IT IS A SUB-RESOURCE COLLECTION OF THE ISSUE, and the argument is
listRelatedIssues' applied to a write: the row this creates is the SAME pinned
`Comment` schema `GET /v0/beads/issues/{id}?include_comments=true` already carries
under `comments`, so the operation that appends one belongs on the resource whose
members it publishes. A PLAIN collection POST rather than a custom method, for
`POST /v0/beads/issues`' reason — creating one member of the collection a path
names is what POST already means — and the collision worth checking rather than
assuming is the POST wildcard: `/v0/beads/issues/{idop}` matches ONE segment after
`/issues/` and this path has two, so the dispatcher never sees a request for it.
Checked by driving the documented path, not by reading the pattern.

THE COLLECTION PUBLISHES NO GET, and that is a statement rather than a gap. No
role answers a comment PAGE: issueops.Commenter says reading the thread is a
second question with a cursor of its own, so a GET here would be this surface
inventing the role that declined to exist. A GET lands on the catch-all and gets
the 404 every method mismatch here gets; 405 is not in the v0 vocabulary.

`author`, NOT `actor`, AND IT IS STILL CALLER-ASSERTED. The two are not the same
member wearing a different name: an `actor` is the principal a mutation is
attributed to and is no part of what the mutation wrote, while this value IS part
of the row and is echoed back by every read of the thread — so it is spelled the
way the `Comment` element that carries it back spells it. It is NOT the
authenticated principal even where a bearer is required, on the claim's terms: the
token a deployment configures admits a client to the whole surface and names
nobody. A reader of the thread is reading a claim the writer made about itself.

THE TWO MEMBERS ARE VALIDATED TO DIFFERENT DEPTHS, and the difference is the
column. `author` lands in a VARCHAR(255) every renderer of the thread prints, so
it gets `actor`'s rules whole — trim, non-empty, 256 bytes, 255 characters,
no control runes — through validateNameMember, which is validateActor's body
parameterized by the member's spelling rather than a second copy of the bounds.
`text` lands in a TEXT column stored VERBATIM, so it is checked for SHAPE only:
no trim, no length bound, no character rule, because a comment is routinely a
stack trace or a diff and the newlines are the comment. Its one content rule —
blank after trimming — stays in the ROLE, rememberMemory's posture, so `bd comment`
and this endpoint refuse the same input with the same sentence.

A WISP IS A LEGAL TARGET, resolved from the facade body rather than assumed and
pinned against real Dolt: the anchor resolves across both planes, the comment
lands on `wisp_comments` and reads back from the ephemeral thread. Only the
DURABLE trace is absent — a comment on an ephemeral row records NO history entry,
because the wisp tables are dolt-ignored precisely so ephemeral work never ships.

NO CONFLICT CODE AND NO GUARD, and both absences are the contract. A thread is
append-only and this write touches no field of the issue, so there is no row state
for an `expected_version` to be stale about and no concurrent comment to collide
with. Not idempotent either — a retry appends a second row, because two identical
comments are a legitimate thread — and the proxied test asserts that against the
table rather than the handler.

ONE ARM IN THE FAILURE PATH, and the deleted one is evidence rather than taste.
There is no explicit ErrNotFound case: ClassifyError already carries that row, and
adding one back leaves the whole package green — measured, the way #5540 measured
the same redundancy. The 400 names `text` unconditionally because exactly one of
the role's three refusals is reachable: the edge refuses an empty author under
strictly stronger rules, and an empty id cannot arrive at all.

RoleFiresHooks DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE COMMENTER, and publishing this operation is
what made that matter. hook_commenter.go has fired the update hook for every
comment it lands since it was written, and the switch that stops `bd serve` from
being handed a hook-firing role had no case for it — harmless only while no front
door took the role off a store. An unpeeled commenter runs the workspace's script
once per comment, which is exactly the write an agent makes in a loop. The case is
added and pinned from both ends.

CENSUS +1 EACH: spec path; AddCommentRequest schema; the document's no-query-
parameter list and its two counts; route row; capability prose (the only hand
edit — Capabilities() is derived); OpAddComment; operationCodes row
(getDependencyTree's vocabulary, no code minted); httpapi.Config.Commenter with
sourceRoles, roleSourceNames, the Server field, Listen and s.commenter();
timedProvider.Commenter and its CommenterSource assertion; checkedCommenter; and
the bd serve binding. Plus Commenter on serveRoleSource and both cmd/bd stubs,
which is #5539's return: a named build error in the file that has to grow a method.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Close the RoleFiresHooks blind spot as a CLASS, and finish 0049 on the ephemeral comment plane

Review found the first version of this branch overclaimed twice. Both claims are
now either true or gone, and both are held by a test rather than by prose.

## The hook guard was blind FOUR ways, not one

The commit said the commenter was "the one hook-firing role RoleFiresHooks did
not know about". It was one of four. `*hookReadyClaimer`, `*hookBatchCloser` and
`*hookBatchCreator` were outside the switch too, and all three are served over
PUBLISHED operations — `issues:claimNext`, `issues:batchClose`,
`issues:batchCreate` — through roles `httpapi.Listen` sweeps by way of that exact
switch. A store-derived value for any of the three was therefore ADMITTED and
served, running the workspace's scripts for the life of the process: once per
bead a polling drainer wins, once per landed item plus one for a chained claim,
and once per item of a batch — so a hundred-item create was a hundred
subprocesses inside one HTTP call.

Fixed: three cases, plus the same both-ends pins the commenter got. Store side,
the accessor really hands back a hook-firing value and `serveIssueRoles` peels to
exactly the layer beneath it (the peel-depth half matters — a peel two layers
deep also answers false and silently drops the telemetry span, so the assertions
check identity, not just the predicate). Server side, `Listen` really refuses each
one.

AND THE PROSE IS NOW TRUE BECAUSE A SCAN MAKES IT TRUE.
`internal/storage/hook_decorator.go` has carried the sentence "every case that
exists today is in the switch" while it was false four ways, because every one of
the four was found by hand by whoever happened to publish an operation over that
role. That is a discovery process, not a guarantee, and it left the others
standing each time. `TestRoleFiresHooksKnowsEveryHookFiringRole` now parses this
package's `hook_*.go` for every decorator that holds an `issueOperationHooks` and
requires a case that RETURNS TRUE for it. Source scan rather than reflection, for
the reason backend/conformance's role census gives: these types are unexported
and are never built except through their accessor.

It counts the RETURN, not the case label, which closes the second failure mode
this switch has actually had: a Go type switch does not fall through, so
`case *hookMetadataCAS:` with an empty body answers FALSE, and a rebase shipped
exactly that with the compiler, vet, lint and CI all green. Mutation-verified in
both directions — deleting a case and emptying a case each fail the scan by name.

## `wisp_comments.text` was still TEXT, so the document's bound was false

The spec said `text`'s only cap is the 1 MiB every body shares. That was true on
one plane. Migration 0049 widened `comments.text` to LONGTEXT and did not touch
`wisp_comments.text`, which has been TEXT — 65535 bytes — since 0021 created the
table. Measured live before the fix: a 102,000-byte comment is 200 against a
durable issue and 500 against a wisp. This operation resolves its anchor across
BOTH planes deliberately, so nothing above the storage seam could tell a caller
which side of the bound it was on until the write failed.

Widened rather than caveated: the two planes should not disagree about what a
comment may contain, and a caveat would have to be re-stated by every client. The
handler grows no length check — there was never one to add; the fix was the
column.

MIGRATION 0065 + ignored/0024, and the twin is required rather than offered:
`wisp_comments` is clone-local and dolt-ignored, so a fresh clone materializes it
from the ignored series while the main cursor arrives at-latest and 0065 never
runs there. That is check D of scripts/check-migration-hygiene.sh, and the same
fresh-clone door ignored/0021 — the wisps half of this identical 0049 gap —
already records. Both guarded on 0049's `COLUMN_TYPE = 'text'` probe, so they are
no-ops on an already-widened workspace and idempotent on replay; the `.down` is
0049's intentional no-op, because shrinking back would truncate.

Verified from both ends: red-first against real Dolt (the wisp 500 above, green
after), and `TestEmbeddedIgnoredSeriesConvergesWithFreshInitShape` — the
engine-level backstop behind check D — fails naming `wisp_comments.text` when the
twin is withheld.

### MIGRATION LANE NOTE, for the deployment checklist

THIS MOVES THE MIGRATION CEILING FROM 0064 TO 0065, and the ignored series from
0023 to 0024. Anything pinned to "latest is 0064" — a deployment checklist, a
pre-flight assertion, a fixture bundle — transfers to 0065 when this lands.
Migration files are frozen once merged (hygiene check C), so a follow-up cannot
edit these two; a fix would be a further migration. NOTHING IS DEPLOYED BY THIS
PR: it ships the files, and the schema moves on whatever schedule the deployment
checklist runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 18:59:57 -07:00
Stephanie Jarmak
0954be4166
feat(list,ready,httpapi): reach the Brief projection from both front doors (#5586)
* feat(list,ready,httpapi): reach the Brief projection from both front doors

Application half of #5546, stacked on the storage half. `--brief` on `bd list`
and `bd ready`, `brief` on `GET /v0/beads/issues` and `GET /v0/beads/ready`.
Defaults to false everywhere, so no payload changes for a caller that does not
ask; #4122 objects to default payload changes and #5078 records what the last
one cost.

ONE REGISTRATION PER COMMAND REACHES BOTH OF ITS ROUTES, because the two
gatherers are shared. `bd list` hands `in.ListRequest` to issueops.Reader.List
verbatim on the direct and the proxied route. `bd ready` uses the Reader role on
NEITHER: both routes pass the filter that gatherReadyInput built through
workapi.BuildReadyFilter, so `types.WorkFilter.Lite` is what has to carry it
there, and the CLI-hop tests assert the filter rather than the request for that
reason. The HTTP handlers build both requests independently of the CLI, so they
are wired separately.

REFUSED WHEREVER IT CANNOT BE HONORED, rather than accepted and dropped, which
is the silent no-op the storage half was written to close. `Lite` reaches a
driver through exactly two queries: the bare SearchIssuesInTx (#3906) and the
counts mega-query (the storage half). `GetReadyWork` and the by-ID hydration
behind the tree walk read neither, so:

  - `bd ready --brief` requires --json, and is refused with --claim, --gated,
    --mol and --explain. `bd ready` runs the counts query for --json alone; the
    text routes call the bare GetReadyWork and the three specialized modes
    answer with shapes of their own. The direct route dispatches those modes
    BEFORE gathering, so each check appears in cmd/bd/ready.go as well as in
    the gatherer, exactly as the --claim conflicts beside them already do.
  - `bd list --brief` works in text mode too, since all of its page routes reach
    Reader.List, and is refused with --watch, with --format, and with --parent
    in the tree view. --tree defaults to true, so a bare --parent in text mode
    is that same walk without the flag being typed.

--claim is refused for a stronger reason than the rest: no route can serve it.
ClaimNext refetches its winning row whole and returns ErrValidation for a
projected request. Catching it in the gatherer keeps the message about the two
flags the user typed, and leaves readyRoleRequest free to carry Brief for the
COUNT, which needs it.

--format is refused rather than annotated because a caller's template can print
any of the six dropped fields and there is nothing to hang a marker on.
`bd list --long` is the one built-in text rendering that prints one of them, and
it is allowed because it CAN say so: it now prints
"Description: (omitted by --brief)". That keys off types.Issue.IsLitePartial
rather than off the flag, so a row that arrived projected reads the same
whichever door set it.

THE JSON PAYLOAD CARRIES NO MARKER, and the flag help and both OpenAPI
descriptions say so plainly. types.Issue.IsLitePartial is `json:"-"` and
documented as internal-only by #3906, so an omitted field is indistinguishable
from an empty one on the wire; only the caller that sent the flag knows. #5549
deferred exactly this marker for brief_deps as its own change, and this follows
that, rather than changing a shared type's wire form on the way past.

`brief` is decoded in handleListReadyWork and NOT in readyFilters, the
vocabulary the ready listing shares with :count and :claimNext, because it
projects fields rather than selecting rows and neither of those returns rows to
project. That made TestClaimNextAdmitsExactlyTheListingsFilters fail, correctly:
its single hardcoded `limit` exception is now a `pageKnobs` table of the
listing's two page knobs, each still asserted ABSENT from claimNext, since a
documented parameter that is always a 400 is a trap. Both branches of that
assertion were verified by sabotage.

RED BEFORE GREEN on all nine new assertions, each verified and reverted: the two
request hops, the seven refusals, the long-format marker, and both branches of
the parity table.

Gates: go build ./..., go vet ./..., gofmt, cmd/bd, internal/httpapi,
internal/workapi, backend/conformance, internal/storage/issueops, issueops,
make api-check, ./scripts/generate-cli-docs.sh --check.

Refs: #5546, #3906

* fix(ready,changelog): close the review findings on #5586

THE THREE DIRECT-ROUTE REFUSALS WERE UNTESTED, and the review's mutation
proved it: deleting the --gated check left `go test ./cmd/bd/` entirely green
while `bd ready --gated --brief` silently ignored the flag on the direct route.
Nothing in the package drives readyCmd's RunE, so the gatherer's tested copies
were only ever guarding the proxied route. The PR body's "seven refusals, red
before green" covered five.

Taking the second of the two suggested fixes, since it removes the duplication
rather than testing it. The per-mode copies in ready.go are deleted. Their body
moves to briefModeConflict, which gatherReadyInput now calls, and RunE calls
once through briefModeConflictFromFlags, hoisted ABOVE the mode dispatch and
above the proxied branch so it is the single place a --brief conflict is
decided for this command on either route.

TestReadyCmdRefusesBriefBeforeItDispatches drives RunE directly, which is
reachable because that check now precedes every store access. Verified by
reproducing the review's own mutation: deleting the hoisted call fails the
--gated, --mol and --explain cases.

THE CHANGELOG ENTRY CONTRADICTED ITSELF, claiming --brief "marks each row
is_lite_partial" and then, in the same paragraph, that the response carries no
marker. The first half was written before the wire form was checked;
types.Issue.IsLitePartial is `json:"-"` and never serialized, so an agent
following that sentence would have grepped its JSON for the field and concluded
the feature was broken. The no-marker fact is now its own paragraph, and the
only marker the entry claims is the text one `bd list --long --brief` prints.
The entry cites #5554 and #5586 alongside #5546, matching the sibling
brief-deps entry.

Gates: go build ./..., go vet ./..., gofmt, cmd/bd, internal/httpapi,
internal/workapi, backend/conformance, internal/storage/issueops, issueops,
make api-check, ./scripts/generate-cli-docs.sh --check.

---------

Co-authored-by: sjarmak <t@t.co>
2026-08-10 13:05:00 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
4e7cc88180
feat(journalops): the mutation journal becomes the third facade namespace (#5552)
* feat(journalops): the mutation journal becomes the third facade namespace

The durable mutation journal's read side is now a role. `journalops` is a
leaf package beside `issueops` and `memoryops` holding Row, Page,
TruncatedError/TruncatedCode and `Journal`, whose doc comment is the
specification: since-exclusive, seq-ascending, limit 0 uncapped with the
wire's cap named as the handler's, a head that comes with its rows and never
decreases, a caught-up checkpoint, and a typed truncation naming a resumable
window.

NOTHING CHANGES BEHAVIOR. The four names in `internal/storage` become
ALIASES of the leaf — `type EventsJournalCursor = journalops.Journal` and its
three siblings — so every implementation, every errors.As site and every
caller compiles unchanged. The alias direction is what avoids the import
cycle: the leaf imports context and fmt and cannot name internal/storage, so
the canon goes down and the alias goes up. Outside storage.go and the
conformance tier, the only non-test edits in this change are COMMENTS.

The role brings the apparatus a role owes:

- backend/conformance/journal_contract.go, six cases over a fixture carrying
  the role, the activation switch, a prune, and a mutation kit that is
  exhaustive against the engine's closed op vocabulary.
- Wirings on all three legs (dolt, embeddeddolt, uow), so #5499's
  entrypoint-scoped lock passes with every leg running every case.
- journalops added to the conformance census's facadePackages. That is the
  #5459 demand side, and the role that needed it: `Journal` is handed out by
  NO accessor — a front door type-asserts for it — so only a source parse can
  see it. issueops.Importer is the precedent.

EventsJournalAccessor and EventsJournalConfigurer stay in internal/storage.
Retention and activation are operator surface, and a server documented to
publish the journal and never retain it must not hold a delete.

Net deletion on the bespoke side: TestEventsJournalPageReportsTheHead is
subsumed by the contract and is gone. TestEventsJournalRestartAndRetentionBoundary
stays, because it observes ReadEventsInTx — the accessor's second read body,
deliberately not on the role — and a mutation of one is invisible to the other.

Mutation-measured, per case, on the embedded leg: an inclusive checkpoint, a
head derived from the page, an untyped truncation, a head taken from MAX(seq)
of surviving rows, and a dropped engine-only op each redden exactly the arm
named for them, and a fixture whose activation hook is a no-op reddens all
six. Reading the head BEFORE the rows leaves all six green — that promise is
declared unpinnable in the contract header rather than faked.

Refs ga-fvya1, ga-2yaqp.4.

* docs(journalops): fix three comment-precision findings from review

All comments, plus one test-only compile-time pin block.

1. journal_facade_test.go told a misassembled causal story: it used the
   CURSOR de-aliasing as its example and then attributed the breakage to
   errors.As. Those are two different failures. Measured, both:
   de-aliasing the interface builds the WHOLE TREE clean and breaks nothing
   behavioral — what it costs is the claim that one role has one name — while
   the error's dangerous shape is not the bare defined type (which loses
   Error() and fails to build) but the COPY-PASTE TWIN, which compiles in
   silence and stops crossing errors.As for everything holding the leaf's
   spelling. Rewritten to say that straight.

2. The seq commit-order unpinnable declaration cited "the dolt package's own
   journal tests" for the server-mode half. Those are single-threaded. The
   actual pin is internal/storage/domain/db/journal_seq_test.go —
   TestEventsJournal_CommitOrderedGaplessSeq drives two OVERLAPPING
   transactions on independent connections, and
   TestEventsJournal_ConcurrentWritersGaplessNoDup a racing batch. Cited
   correctly, and the single-threaded ones named as NOT the pin.

3. EveryMutationKindLandsARow's runs-last ordering is load-bearing but held
   by convention: a reorder compiles, passes, and silently gives up the only
   coverage that a journal keeps recording after a full prune. It was stated
   in the dispatch table and the three leg wirings; it is now stated at the
   case itself, where somebody editing a leg file is actually looking.

And the compile-time half of the alias pin, which fires before any test runs:
a pointer conversion per name. The pointer form is not decoration — for the
three structs a plain assignment would do, but for the INTERFACE it would be
blind, since interface-to-interface assignment goes by method set and a
de-aliased cursor still accepts a journalops.Journal. Watched fail: the
de-aliased interface, which nothing else in the tree catches.

---------

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
2026-08-10 10:58:05 -07:00
Stephanie Jarmak
4a76685f90
feat(show,httpapi): reach BriefDeps from both front doors, with conformance coverage (#5549)
* feat(show): --brief-deps flag reaching DetailOptions.BriefDeps

Application half of #5546, stacked on #5547. Both show routes gather flags
separately, so the flag is read in cmd/bd/show.go and in
gatherShowProxiedInput; a flag added to one reaches neither by implication.

Defaults to false, so the JSON payload is unchanged for callers that do not
ask. #4122 objects to default payload changes and #5078 records what the last
one cost.

Measured against a 16,051-issue store: bd show <id> --json is 216,605 bytes and
the same call with --brief-deps is 23,287, an 89.3% reduction, with the
identity fields intact and zero bytes of dependency text.

* feat(httpapi,conformance): reach BriefDeps from the HTTP door and pin it

Review follow-ups from #5547.

The conformance case is the blocking one: backend/conformance pins
IncludeDependents/IncludeComments so an out-of-tree Reader cannot ignore them,
and BriefDeps landed on the same public contract with no case. Registered at
all four call sites. Verified non-vacuous by disabling the projection and
watching TestReaderContract go red against a real backend.

The HTTP handler builds GetRequest independently of the CLI, so wiring cmd/bd
alone left the field reachable from one front door of two. Adds the brief_deps
query parameter to the v0 spec and regenerates apigen types; make api-check is
green.

Also: the cmd/bd flag test reset the value but left pflag's Changed true, which
outlives the value and contaminates later tests in the package.

* fix(conformance,show): close the review findings on #5549

The conformance case asserted Design and AcceptanceCriteria were empty without
ever seeding them, so a Reader that stripped description and notes but leaked
the other two passed. That is the same fixture-blindness the parent PR was
written against. Seeds all four heavy fields, and asserts Title, which the
projection deliberately keeps and the OpenAPI text promises.

Both CLI routes built GetRequest inline inside functions that need a
UnitOfWork, so the hop was unreachable from a test and deleting either
assignment left the suite green. Extracted showGetRequest and
showProxiedInput.getRequest and pinned both, matching what the HTTP door
already had.

The case now gets its own Test at each storage call site rather than riding
inside the OptionalRowLists test, so a BriefDeps failure reports under its own
name instead of misdirecting triage. The embeddeddolt site no longer builds a
second fixture.

Adds the CHANGELOG entry for the #5547 + #5549 pair, at the point the feature
becomes reachable.

---------

Co-authored-by: sjarmak <t@t.co>
2026-08-10 08:40:32 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
ff75b45c91
docs: the ext-api-store documentation tranche — post-#5516 auth sweep, wave doc coherence, role checklist refresh (#5545)
Three beads (ga-uwix0.1, ga-2yaqp.5, ga-2yaqp.6) plus a fable review round.
Docs and spec prose only: all 19 touched .go files are gofmt-normalized,
comment-stripped byte-identical to main. The one exception is deliberate and
reviewed — scripts/check_doc_freshness_test.go gains a data row, because the
delegated gate ruling required it.

ga-uwix0.1 — #5516 gave bd serve optional bearer auth and made it MANDATORY
beyond loopback; fifteen prose sites still said the opposite. The three the
council named are reworded to the stronger true form (the actor is not the
authenticated principal even where a bearer is required; a shared token admits
a client to the WHOLE surface and grants no narrower right). The sweep for a
fourth found eight more in five spellings the audit's grep could not reach,
including claim.go's "any client can claim as any name", release.go's
no-AUTHORIZATION variant, and six memory/settings-plane sites where the true
statement is sharper: a bearer decides WHO may call, never what a caller who
is let in may read. The review round found four more in the CHANGELOG's
UNRELEASED section, which round one had misclassified as released history —
they would have shipped false in the same release as the auth entry.

The serve runbook's "Binding beyond loopback" section was actionably wrong: it
said the flag "prints a warning and changes nothing else", and its refusals
table quoted a string not in the binary. Rewritten against a build, with every
flag, error string, event name and reason value produced by running the
command. It gains the operational trap nobody had written down: /healthz is
auth-exempt and GET /v0/beads/ready is not, so an unauthenticated readiness
probe earns a 401 forever while liveness stays green. The runbook is now IN
scripts/check-doc-freshness.sh, pinned to the four files it is read against.

ga-2yaqp.5 — nine prose defects, every count re-derived rather than trusted;
three of the audit's own numbers had moved again. 38 route rows and 36
capability-bearing ones; thirteen pinned schemas, not twelve or seven; six
missing entries in the no-query-parameter list, not five; twenty-eight role
accessors, not twenty-seven; nineteen patch members, not thirteen. Two prose
"code counts" were counting paragraphs. CodeAlreadyClaimed claimed the holder
is always attached when only one of four producers always attaches it and
releaseIssue never does. MetadataCAS's leaf contradicted its own shipped wire.
The path/operationId inversion is now recorded where a spec author looks.

ga-2yaqp.6 — the role checklist refreshed against what this wave's additions
actually cost, traced to real commits. Step 10 sent people to a name list
#5460 deleted. The "four more edits" claim was stated twice and undercounted
both times: the two freshest wire slices share a nine-file core plus
roles_test.go. The step-with-no-number gained the fact that explains its
instances — write-role decorators wrap, read-role decorators recurse, so the
call lands on the stub, and both real instances are reads. The wave got its
first CHANGELOG entry: six new public operations, not three, and zero new role
accessors in the window.

Review verdict: FIX-REQUIRED then all items addressed. The reviewer
live-falsified the strong auth form and failed to break it, and confirmed
every recount re-derives exact.
2026-08-10 08:05:07 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
2a4b75b810
Publish GET /v0/beads/issues/{id}/related, the wire half of issueops.Relations (ga-81p36) (#5540)
Relations is one of the facade methods the ext-api-store audit lists with no
wire operation, and it is the one gc's infra-over-http read surface cannot do
without: `bd dep list`'s dependents view has no other direction-aware wire path,
because EdgeReader is outgoing-only. This is that operation. The role, its
contract and all three legs already exist; this slice wires them.

Spec first, then `make api-gen`, then the handler.

IT IS A SUB-RESOURCE OF THE ISSUE, and the argument is ELEMENT IDENTITY rather
than a claim about what the dependency collection answers with — getDependencyTree
answers hydrated TreeNodes, so "everything under /dependencies is about edges"
would be false and is not said. What decides it is narrower and checkable: the
rows here are the SAME pinned struct `GET /v0/beads/issues/{id}` already carries
under `dependencies` and `dependents`, so this operation is that pair,
standalone, direction-parameterized and type-filterable, and it belongs on the
resource whose members it publishes: `/v0/beads/issues/{id}/related`. The route table's first sub-resource: the
segment is a LITERAL after a single-segment wildcard, so pattern and specPath
agree and the claim row's exception does not apply. It collides with nothing —
`/v0/beads/issues/{id}` is a different whole path, which is what ServeMux
matches on, and the custom-method dispatcher is POST-only and one segment
shorter.

The consequence is stated in the document rather than left to be discovered:
the length of `items` is a NEIGHBOR count and not an EDGE count, because a
target that is an `external:` reference or another repository's id has no far
end here and is silently not a neighbor. The same edge IS a row on
`GET /v0/beads/dependencies`. That single observation is what separates the two
operations, and the proxied test asserts both halves of it against real Dolt.

THE ANCHOR-BOUND maxItems GATE DOES NOT APPLY. The facade signature is
single-anchor — one `RelatedRequest.ID`, not a slice — so there is no question
to bound at 100 the way the three dependency-collection reads bound theirs, and
`TestSpecDefaultsMatchSharedConstants`' three-op loop is deliberately untouched.
The other side of single-anchor is the 404: those reads report a miss per anchor
because failing would throw away the ids that were found, and here there is one
anchor and nothing to preserve. `getDependencyTree`'s operationCodes row,
unchanged, is this one's.

TWO-PLANE, AND BOTH HALVES ARE REAL. The neighbours are collected from
`dependencies` AND `wisp_dependencies` and hydrated from `issues` AND `wisps`,
so a durable anchor's `in` answer includes the wisps that depend on it and a
wisp id is a legal ANCHOR. Resolved from the bodies, not assumed, and pinned
against real Dolt: a durable anchor with one durable and one wisp dependent
answers two, and the wisp element carries `ephemeral` — which is what catches an
implementation that spanned the edge tables and hydrated one issue table.

VALIDATION STAYS IN THE ROLE, on `dependencies:count`'s terms rather than
`issues:count`'s. Relations has two bodies and every accessor calls
ValidateRelatedRequest, so its refusals are reachable over the wire: the handler
forwards `direction` raw and classifies on the sentinel, naming the parameter by
re-asking the validator's own questions in its own order. Only two of the
validator's three refusals are reachable — the path bound turns an unusable id
into the 404 a real miss gets, which is why there is no `id` arm in the picker
and why the tests say so.

Census: +1 spec path, +1 schema (`RelatedIssues`, unpinned for `EdgeCounts`'
reason — the element under it is the pinned one), +1 route row, +1 capability
(`issues.related`, hand-edited only in the document's vocabulary — `Capabilities()`
is derived and untouched), +1 `Op*` const, +1 `operationCodes` row, +1 required
`Config` field with its `sourceRoles`/`roleSourceNames`/accessor lines, +1 `bd
serve` binding. No code was minted: every problem code on the row is inherited.

THE "STEP WITH NO NUMBER" IS NOW A BUILD ERROR, and this is the first role to
measure that rather than assert it. #5539 landed the serveRoleSource subset while
this was in review, so `IssueRelations` joins that interface and both `cmd/bd`
stubs are COMPELLED to declare it — omitting either is

    *serveRolesStore does not implement serveRoleSource (missing method IssueRelations)

in the file that has to grow the method, checked both ways. Counter and
GraphCounter had to be FOUND, the second only by a full-package CI shard; this
one could not be missed. Both stub comments are rewritten to say so: the
promoted-method-on-a-nil-embed narrative is history now, not instruction, and on
the identity stub the surviving load-bearing fact is PLACEMENT — the accessor
sits at depth 1, shallower than serveStubRest's nil store, so it shadows the
promotion and the assertion can see it. Swept for a third stub site reaching this
path: serve_registered_backend_test.go reuses serveIdentityDoltStore and a real
embeddeddolt.Open, so there is none. A drive-by one-liner beside all that:
timedProvider gained the `uow.GraphCounterSource` compile-time assertion #5536's
accessor landed without.

One arm was DELETED after measurement. failRelatedErr shipped with an explicit
`storage.ErrNotFound` case, mutating it out left every case in the package green
— ClassifyError already carries that row, so the 404 travels through the one
shared mapping — and a green arm named for half the contract is worse than no
arm. The ErrValidation arm is the opposite: deleting it turns every refusal on
this operation into a generic 500, and both measurements are recorded at the
site.

Evidence, six mutations. The picker's arms collapsed reddens the four direction
cases and nothing else; the ErrValidation arm deleted reddens all five refusal
cases; `items` as a nil slice reddens the empty-array case; the path bound
dropped reddens the impossible-anchor case; the dependents read narrowed to
`dependencies` and the hydration narrowed to `issues` each redden the two-plane
case against real Dolt at 1-of-2. A seventh, a json tag on types.Issue.RowVersion,
reddens the no-revision case — and TestWireTagBijection too, which the test now
says out loud.

Rebased onto #5539 (06b0dffb2). Fable review: APPROVE, zero blocking findings
— the reviewer re-ran every mutation, probed the router live (an issue literally
named "related" does not shadow the detail read), and confirmed the
environmental-failure set name-identical to pristine main. Its one INFO, the
overclaimed placement rationale, is the paragraph rewritten above.

Gates: `make api-check` a no-op, `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `gofmt -l`
clean, `internal/httpapi` + `internal/telemetry` + `internal/storage` +
`internal/storage/uow` (the nine-minute parity run) green, and
`BEADS_TEST_PROXIED_SERVER=1 CGO_ENABLED=1 go test ./cmd/bd/ -run
TestProxiedServerServeRelatedIssues` green against real Dolt in five cases. The
pre-commit hook's `go run golangci-lint@v2.10.1` downgrades the toolchain to
go1.25 and refuses this go1.26.5 module outright (ga-2ltro.13), so the
CI-pinned binary was run by hand — `golangci-lint run --new-from-rev=origin/main`,
0 issues — and this commits with --no-verify citing that bead.

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 05:23:30 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
06b0dffb22
Make the next serve role a compile error, and check the one role with a positional result (#5539)
* refactor(serve): make the next role a compile error in the serve stubs

serveIssueRoles took a whole storage.DoltStorage, so the test stubs that
stand in for a store satisfied it the only affordable way: embed the
interface and leave it nil. Every accessor a stub had not declared then
arrived as a promoted method on a nil interface — a segfault inside role
extraction, not a compile error.

It has landed twice in one PR cycle, both on GraphCounter. First in
serve_source_test.go, then in serve_store_identity_test.go, where no local
-run pattern names the test and only a full cmd/bd shard found it.

So the function now asks for serveRoleSource: the accessor subset it
actually reaches, which a whole store still satisfies. Both stubs declare
that subset and assert it, and the store they must still BE — the
decorator chain takes one, and backends.Backend.Open returns one — comes
from an embed one level deeper that their own accessors shadow. Adding a
role to the loop is now:

    cannot use (*serveRolesStore)(nil) ... does not implement
    serveRoleSource (missing method GraphCounter)

ADDING_AN_ISSUEOPS_ROLE.md's "step with no number" listed these two stubs
among the surfaces to grep for by hand; it now says this pair is taken
care of and the rest still are not.

Swept the embed pattern across cmd/bd for a third instance reaching this
path: none.

Bead: ga-c3g45

* fix(httpapi): check the batch closer, the one role with a positional result

internal/httpapi has checked wrappers for Reader, BatchCreator, Lifecycle,
Claimer and Releaser, but the batch closer went out unwrapped — on the
reasoning that CloseBatchResult is a value and its issue pointer is
forwarded rather than dereferenced. True, and it is why there is no panic
here to prevent. What it left unguarded is the thing this role owns that
none of the others do: an array the client reads POSITIONALLY.

Two shapes reached the wire as answers rather than faults, and they fold
at different scopes:

  - An outcome count that does not match the request cannot be walked
    against the caller's items at all. Projected anyway it reports one
    item's answer under another item's id for the rest of the array,
    silently, inside a 200. Whole-batch 500, never a partial projection —
    checkedBatchCreator's refusal exactly.

  - An outcome carrying neither a row nor a refusal has no honest wire
    shape: `code`'s absence promises `issue`, so it projects as a success
    with no row, which is the shape closeOutcome's `default` branch
    already refuses to produce. Folded into THAT item, because this batch
    is not all-or-nothing — the survivors have committed, and failing the
    request would hide durable closes.

The fold corrects a copy: the outcomes slice is the role's, and one that
answers from a prepared result would otherwise carry this server's
correction into everything it hands back afterwards.

No wire shape changes and no spec changes; make api-check is a no-op, and
the error classification order in failBatchClose is untouched.

Bead: ga-39tl5

---------

Co-authored-by: Julian Knutsen <ci@beads.test>
2026-08-10 04:34:15 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
86d24711c6
Publish GET /v0/beads/dependencies:count, the wire half of issueops.GraphCounter (#5536)
The role landed facade-only (#5485) with neither front door, and its own doc
said why: the numbers it answers are already printed through internal/workapi's
detail seam, and the wire operation "lands in the graph-counts wire slice".
This is that slice. What it buys is the question the stored-edge read cannot
ask — how many edges, in a direction the caller names, without materializing a
row.

Spec first, then `make api-gen`, then the handler.

IT IS NOT THE LISTING COUNTED, and the operationId says so. `listDependencies`
is OUTGOING ONLY and takes no direction; this one REQUIRES a direction and
answers about either end, so the two agree on a number at `direction=out` and
nowhere else. `countDependencies` would have promised they always agree, so it
is `countDependencyEdges` — and the path is `/v0/beads/dependencies:count`,
the collection-level custom method `ready:count` and `issues:count` already
spell, on the collection whose listing it sits beside. Both segments are
literal, so pattern and specPath agree; it collides with nothing, because
/cycles, /blocking and /tree all carry a separating slash and ServeMux matches
whole segments.

THE ANSWER IS PER ANCHOR, which is the shape difference from the listing beside
it. An edge row carries its own `issue_id`, so that operation flattens; a number
does not, so folding these would produce a total nobody asked for and lose the
per-issue answer every caller wants. `anchors` is an ARRAY in first-mention
order — the role's doc says a map would be the one result shape a wire
operation cannot carry without inventing a key vocabulary, and that the
request's order is part of the answer. `count` and `missing` are both emitted
on every entry: 0 is the COMMON answer here and `missing` is the only thing
that tells a typo from an issue that genuinely has none.

THE IDS CAP IS THE ONE THE LEAF ASSIGNED TO THIS SLICE. EdgeCountRequest.IDs
says there is no size cap on the role, that the bound belongs to the WIRE, and
that "the graph-counts wire slice sets it". It is 100 — the same number, from
the same `maxDependencyAnchors`, as the stored-edge read on the same
collection, because the two bound the same thing and a client holding both
should not have to learn two numbers. And it is now PINNED: nothing kept the
document's maxItems and the Go constant together on ANY of the operations that
read it, so TestSpecDefaultsMatchSharedConstants grew a case covering all
THREE — including listBlockingAnnotations, which enforces the same constant and
declares the same maxItems and predates this slice entirely. Pinning only the
two operations this slice touched would have gated the copies that happened to
be in front of me and left the oldest one free to drift.

VALIDATION STAYS IN THE ROLE, which is the opposite of `issues:count` and for a
reason the checklist spells out. That operation refuses its one enum at the edge
because NO role refusal is reachable; here the role has ONE body on all three
legs with ValidateEdgeCountRequest inside it, so four refusals are reachable —
a missing or unrecognized direction, a status beside direction=out, an empty id,
an unusable type. The handler classifies on the sentinel and names the
parameter by re-asking the validator's own questions IN THE VALIDATOR'S OWN
ORDER, which is part of that function's contract. Two cases carry two offenders
each and assert the FIRST is named; swapping the picker's arms reddens them.

The role's own semantics — sum-not-distinct, both dependency planes, the status
asymmetry, the missing-anchor rule — are CITED, never restated. A second telling
is a second thing to keep true.

Config gains a required GraphCounter field on the checklist's terms, `bd serve`
binds it beside the issue counter, and TWO stub stores gain the accessor — the checklist's "step with no number", found exactly as it
predicts: the read role's hook decorator RECURSES, the recursion lands on a
stub that embeds a nil DoltStorage, and the panic arrived the moment `bd serve`
began binding the role. storage.RoleFiresHooks needs nothing, because that
table takes only decorators that WRAP.

THE SECOND STUB IS THE ONE WORTH RECORDING, because it says what the checklist's
warning actually costs. serve_source_test.go was found by running the tests a
role slice thinks to run; serve_store_identity_test.go's serveIdentityStore has
the same nil embed and was found only by the FULL-SUITE macOS shard, because no
test name in that file matches a pattern anyone would guess
(TestServeAnswersFromTheStoreTheRootCommandOpened). #5508's own message recorded
this same gap — "I ran the proxied shards by name and never the whole cmd/bd
package" — and I repeated it. The rule that actually holds is the checklist's:
GREP FOR THE EMBED, NOT FOR THE INTERFACE. Both stubs are now swept, and a
tree-wide sweep for a type declaring Counter() without GraphCounter() finds no
third.

The structural fix is deliberately NOT in this slice: as long as these stubs
embed the whole storage.DoltStorage interface, every future read role is a
promoted method on a nil interface — a segfault rather than a compile error.
Replacing the embed with an explicit role-accessor subset would turn the next
one into a build failure, and that is its own change.

ONE NICE PROOF OF #5508's WORK: the capability list needed ZERO hand edits in
Go. routes.go's diff is a table row and nothing else — `Capabilities()` is
untouched — and TestSpecCapabilityVocabularyMatchesTheRouteTable passes, which
means the derived list picked `dependencies.count` up on its own. The only hand
edit was the document's own prose vocabulary, which is precisely what that gate
exists to demand.

Evidence. Three mutations, each red in the right place: the picker's arms
reordered reddens the two-offender cases and nothing else; `omitempty` on
`count`/`missing` reddens the per-anchor case (which decodes through pointers
for exactly that reason); the anchor cap as `>=` reddens the at-the-cap
assertion that the two refusal cases could not see. A fourth, drifting the
spec's maxItems to 50, reddens the new shared-constant pin.

Real Dolt through a real `bd serve`, five cases: out and in over an ASYMMETRIC
fixture (2 and 3, so neither direction can pass by coincidence) with the
outbound count reconciled against the rows `GET /v0/beads/dependencies`
returns; the TWO-PLANE SUM, where a durable anchor depended on by one durable
issue and one wisp counts 2 across `dependencies` and `wisp_dependencies` — a
count reading one table answers 1 and looks fine; a missing anchor reported
beside two found ones, both of the other two carrying 0 so only the flag
separates them; the status filter narrowing inbound edges by the dependent's
stored status, an unrecognized status counting 0 rather than failing, and the
400 naming `status` beside direction=out; and a repeated anchor answered once.

Gates: `make api-check`, `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `gofmt -l` clean,
`golangci-lint run --new-from-rev=origin/main` on the touched packages (0
issues), `internal/httpapi`, `internal/telemetry`, `internal/storage` and
`internal/storage/uow` (the nine-minute parity run the checklist names), and
`BEADS_TEST_PROXIED_SERVER=1 CGO_ENABLED=1 go test ./cmd/bd/ -run
TestProxiedServerServeEdgeCounts` green against real Dolt. The pre-commit hook's
`go run golangci-lint@v2.10.1` fails on this host with a toolchain mismatch
unrelated to this change, so the hook's contents were run by hand before
committing with --no-verify.

Stacked on feat/httpapi-read-revision (#5535); rebase after that merges.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 02:06:57 -07:00
CI Bot
b9f38840b8 feat(httpapi): per-request project-id enforcement (Bd-Project-Id header)
Server-API hardening for the loopback HTTP surface: a request may now carry a
Bd-Project-Id header naming the workspace the client means to address, and the
server refuses it with 400 / invalid_argument / reason=project_mismatch when the
id does not match the project this server serves. This closes wrong-server reads
and writes structurally rather than by convention — a client that stamps its
requests can no longer silently operate against a workspace it did not intend,
and the refusal is raised before any database slot or unit of work is acquired,
so a misdirected request mutates nothing.

The check is capability-gated and backward-compatible:

- Absent header is today's behavior. Enforcement triggers only when the header
  arrives, so clients already in the field are served exactly as before; this is
  additive wire surface, not a new precondition.
- The comparison is literal. A server whose own project id is empty refuses any
  non-empty stamp, mirroring the identity handshake: a server asserts only the
  identity it can prove.
- /healthz and GET /v0/beads/context are exempt (projectExempt), the two reads
  that touch no database: liveness must answer whatever workspace a caller
  believed it reached, and the handshake is where a client learns the id to
  stamp with in the first place.
- The refusal alone carries the server's own id in the new optional Problem
  member server_project_id, and only after the request clears the Host gate — a
  refusal raised earlier never discloses server identity.
- A new behavior capability, project.enforce, advertises the check so a client
  relies on the refusal instead of discovering an older server ignored its
  stamp.

The OpenAPI document is the source of truth: a fourth document-level cross-cutting
400 rule, the server_project_id Problem member, the project_mismatch reason, and
both capabilities prose sites are updated; the Go wire types are regenerated from
it. The proxied bd-serve capability literal
(cmd/bd/serve_proxied_integration_test.go: servedCapabilities) is updated to
carry the new project.enforce token, so the GET /v0/beads/context contract test
that asserts the advertised set exactly stays green in the proxied-server cmd
tier. Local gate green (make api-check clean; full internal/httpapi suite and the
proxied serve lifecycle test pass).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 01:26:42 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
6775f60f67
Publish revision on the detail read: the token a guarded write is composed from (#5535)
Every `expected_version` on this surface is composed from a token some response
carried, and until now every response that carried one was a WRITE. A client
that wanted to read a row, decide from what it said, and write it back under a
guard had to precede its first guarded write with a write it did not want to
make — or guard on nothing, which is the lost update the whole family exists to
refuse. Five places in the document said "no READ on this surface publishes a
revision yet" and named the member a read would have to agree with. This is that
member.

Spec first, then `make api-gen`, then the projection.

GET /v0/beads/issues/{id} PUBLISHES IT; GET /v0/beads/issues DOES NOT, and the
reason is not payload. Measured against a 20,482-row production export the
member is 28 bytes on a 1449-byte median row — under 2%, and the list rows are
already fat enough that a token would disappear into them. The reason is that
`types.IssueWithCounts` is ALSO THE INTERCHANGE ROW: `exportIssueRecord` embeds
it in both `bd export` and the auto-export that flushes a git-tracked
`issues.jsonl`, and the token is re-minted by every write, so publishing it on
that element would put a per-write-random value into a file whose whole value is
that it diffs when something meant something. That is precisely the loss
`types.Issue.RowVersion`'s `json:"-"` is there to prevent, and a wire member
cannot opt out of it — the list element and the export element are one pinned Go
struct. `types.IssueDetails` has neither problem: nothing interchanges it, and
`workapi.BuildIssueDetails` is its ONE production construction site against
IssueWithCounts's SIX, which is the second half of the argument. (Six
field-populating non-test literals: export.go, export_auto.go, search.go,
claim_next.go, ready_work_counts.go and uow/ready_claimer.go. The `[]*T{claimed}`
spellings in ready.go and ready_proxied_server.go are slice literals wrapping a
role-built element, not independent places to forget a field, and they are not
counted.) A token field on a struct built in six places is silently 0 wherever a
site forgets it, and 0 is a LEGAL token (the migration-0054 backfill), so
nothing — no test, no client — can tell a forgotten one from a legacy row.

So the projection moved onto the canonical type behind ONE DOOR. types.Revision
is set by types.NewIssueDetails and nowhere else, because a struct literal with
an unset token publishes a wrong answer that looks exactly like a right one.

THE DOOR IS WRITTEN INTO THE DOCUMENT, not just into this description. A later
revision that wants the token on the list rows needs a list element that is NOT
the interchange element, and the listing's own prose now says so — together with
the rule a client needs meanwhile: model the absent member as ABSENT, never as
0, because 0 is a real token and a client that defaulted would compose guards
matching exactly the rows it is most dangerous to be wrong about.

THIS DELETES A PARITY DIVERGENCE RATHER THAN ADDING ONE. `bd show --json` has
published this token for as long as guarded writes have existed, through a
CLI-only wrapper, and `readsParityAllowlist` waived the difference with the note
"if the token is ever needed over HTTP, extend that surface and delete this
entry". The wrapper is gone, both front doors read the member off the one detail
seam, and the allowlist is now EMPTY — kept declared, because an empty allowlist
is a stronger statement than no allowlist.

The wire council's outstanding fix rides along, because it is the same member
family: `ApplyItemResult.revision` and both apply-item `expected_version`
members gained the DECODE-AS-64-BIT clause every other revision-bearing member
already carried. The batch spelling is where it bites hardest — a token
corrupted by an IEEE-754-double parser refuses the WHOLE plan rather than one
write.

Evidence. Four mutations, each watched to go red in the right place and only
there: the constructor stopping projecting reddens all three legs; the seam
regressing to a struct literal reddens the workapi pin ALONE and leaves the
httpapi case green, which is why both exist; `omitempty` reddens exactly the
legacy-zero arms; and adding the field to `types.IssueWithCounts` reddens the
new list case while leaving `TestRowVersionNeverSerialized` GREEN — the separate
unset field carries none of the forbidden spellings — and reddens
`TestWireTagBijection` only while the document has not caught up. That measured
pair is written into the new case's own comment, because it is why the case is
not redundant with either gate.

Real Dolt through a real `bd serve`: read the token, guard a patch with it, watch
it land; watch a write move it; watch the read and the write agree on the new
one; watch the stale guard 409 with `param: expected_version`; re-read and watch
the retry land. The same loop on `close`, and the ephemeral fallback — where the
token is a different column on a different table and the failure mode is a zero
rather than an absence.

Gates: `make api-check`, `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `gofmt -l` clean,
`golangci-lint run --new-from-rev=origin/main` on the touched packages (0
issues), the internal/types, internal/workapi, internal/httpapi and
internal/storage package runs, the byte-pinned `cmd/bd/protocol` corpus, and
`BEADS_TEST_PROXIED_SERVER=1 CGO_ENABLED=1 go test ./cmd/bd/ -run
'TestProxiedServerServeReadRevision|TestProxiedServerServeReadParity'` green
against real Dolt. The pre-commit hook's `go run golangci-lint@v2.10.1` fails on
this host with a toolchain mismatch unrelated to this change, so the hook's
contents were run by hand before committing with --no-verify.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 00:27:49 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
ffb41ae3ad
Publish GET /v0/beads/issues:count, with the role's whole filter surface (#5508)
* Publish GET /v0/beads/issues:count, with the role's whole filter surface

issueops.Counter is the role the ADDING_AN_ISSUEOPS_ROLE checklist was derived
from, and it was the last read role on the store with no HTTP half. `bd count`
reached it; nothing over the wire did. A client that wanted a number had to
page a listing and count the rows, which answers a DIFFERENT question: a
listing hides closed, pinned, template and gate rows and a count hides none of
them, so the two disagree by every one of those exclusions.

Spec first, then `make api-gen`, then the handler.

ONE OPERATION FOR BOTH OF THE ROLE'S METHODS. `group_by` selects the bucketed
shape, because the two ask the same predicate of the same set and the grouped
response is the scalar response PLUS `groups` — one schema with an optional
member, not two contracts under one id. That is the opposite of `events:watch`,
which is a sibling operation because it differs in media type, lifetime, limits
and capacity; here nothing differs but one member.

The full CountRequest surface is published — 23 filters plus the dimension —
because a wire narrower than the role would make an HTTP-backed store answer
questions the native one can and it cannot. The two parameters that could
mislead are documented rather than smoothed over: `status` is ONE status here
where the listing takes a comma-separated set, and `include_infra` changes four
things at once (merges the wisps tier, drops templates, drops gates, routes an
infra type to the ephemeral tier).

One finding worth the ledger: NO ROLE REFUSAL IS REACHABLE from this operation.
issueops.Counter has exactly one ErrValidation — ValidateCountGroup's unknown
dimension, since BuildCountFilter cannot fail — and the handler refuses that
dimension at the edge, so every `invalid_argument` here is the transport's. The
spec, the operationCodes row and a test all say so, and
TestCountGroupEnumMatchesTheRolesVocabulary is what keeps it true: a dimension
this server accepted and the role refused would arrive as an unclassified 500.

The wisp-plane question is answered against real Dolt rather than asserted: a
default count is DURABLE ONLY and `include_infra` merges the ephemeral tier in,
both agreeing with `bd count`'s own numbers through the same role.

Config gains a required Counter field on the checklist's own terms — a Config
missing it would bind, advertise issues.count and nil-dereference on the first
request — and `bd serve` binds it beside the ready counter.

Gates: `make api-check`, `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `gofmt -l` clean,
`golangci-lint run` on the touched packages, `--new-from-rev=origin/main`, and
the windows/no-cgo cross-lint the PR workflow runs (0 issues each), plus
`BEADS_TEST_PROXIED_SERVER=1 CGO_ENABLED=1 go test ./cmd/bd/ -run
TestProxiedServerServeCount` green against real Dolt. The pre-commit hook's
`go run golangci-lint@v2.10.1` fails on this host with a toolchain mismatch
unrelated to this change, so the hook's contents were run by hand before
committing with --no-verify.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Derive both capability expectations from the route table

The count slice went red on a proxied shard for a list nothing about counting
had changed: cmd/bd's servedCapabilities is a second hand-written copy of the
capability vocabulary, and the thirteen checks a stacked PR runs do not include
the proxied shards. The literal was updated in internal/httpapi and missed out
here — which is the failure mode the list's own comment describes ("the
server-mode copy sat at four entries through every expansion since"), happening
again for the same reason.

Both literals are now derived from routeTable, which already carries capability
and implemented and already feeds the spec-vocabulary check.

The argument the old comment made against deriving — "comparing the server
against its own derivation would pass for any surface at all" — is true and is
answered somewhere better. TestSpecCapabilityVocabularyMatchesTheRouteTable
compares the derived set against the `capabilities` prose in openapi.v0.yaml in
BOTH directions, and that paragraph is written by hand for the operation being
added. So content still has an independent oracle, adding an operation still
costs a deliberate edit, and the edit is now in the document a client reads
rather than in two test files nobody does.

internal/httpapi re-derives from the table rather than calling Capabilities(),
which the handler already calls: Capabilities() == Capabilities() is green for
every surface including an empty one. A non-empty guard and a sortedness
assertion on the wire keep it from passing vacuously; reversing the sort turns
it red.

Two assertions written for this were DELETED after mutation testing showed they
cannot fail — a stub-advertises-itself loop and an implemented-gate check, both
green against the mutations they were named for, because the expectation
re-applies the same filter and v0 has no 501 rows to filter. The comment says
so and names what actually holds the gate (TestSpecStatusCodesMatchHandlerTable
fails on any unimplemented row) and the probe that would upgrade it.

Also, from review:

- TestEveryCountRequestFieldIsPublished pins issueops.CountRequest's 23 filters
  against the parameters that reach them. A 24th field left unpublished turned
  nothing red before, and an unreachable role filter is exactly how an
  HTTP-backed store becomes narrower than the native one without anyone
  deciding to narrow it. Falsified against a hypothetical field.
- TestCountParametersMatchTheHandler's comment records that its derivation is by
  EXECUTION: it sees the names read on the path taken, which is the whole
  vocabulary only because countFilters is straight-line today.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Declare Counter on the serve stub store

CI's macOS shard caught what my local runs did not: binding the count role in
serveIssueRoles made TestServeIssueRolesComeFromBeneathTheHookDecorator panic
with a nil dereference.

This is the hazard ADDING_AN_ISSUEOPS_ROLE.md calls "the step with no number" —
every surface that EMBEDS the store gains a new accessor PROMOTED rather than
declared, so the build stays green and the first symptom is a nil dereference in
somebody else's stub. serveRolesStore embeds a nil storage.DoltStorage and
declares only the roles its own test is about; Counter was not one of them.

The count role made it reachable for a reason worth recording: Counter is a
READ, so hook_counter.go RECURSES and hands back the inner surface unwrapped —
and that recursion lands on this stub. A role whose decorator wraps would have
stopped at the wrapper.

The other surfaces the checklist names were checked and need nothing:
storage.RoleFiresHooks takes cases only for decorators that WRAP, and uow's
notifying provider has declared CounterSource since the role landed.

The gap that let it through was mine: I ran the proxied shards by name and never
the whole cmd/bd package. Running it now shows an identical failure set on this
branch and on a clean origin/main worktree — 25 tests, all collateral from the
package exceeding go test's default 10m timeout on this host.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 19:39:13 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
2632d57e09
feat(serve): optional bearer auth and a Host allowlist for bd serve (#5516)
bd serve's help says "No authentication and no TLS", and the first half of that
is what stops it being deployed anywhere but a developer's loopback. Two flags
answer it, and both default to the behavior that exists today: a `bd serve` with
no arguments is byte-for-byte the server it has always been.

AUTHENTICATION

  --auth-token-file names a file of accepted tokens, one per line, all
  accepted. There is deliberately no --auth-token: a credential passed as an
  argument is readable by every local user out of ps.

  The accepted set is NOT a startup snapshot. It is re-read while the server
  runs, gated to at most one stat(2) per second for the whole process, and that
  is what makes rotation hitless — write {new,old}, roll the clients, drop old —
  and what makes a leaked token revocable inside a second without a restart.
  The freshness check runs on the ACCEPTING path too, not only on a mismatch:
  a token the operator just deleted still matches the cached set, so a
  mismatch-triggered reload would give rotation and never give revocation.

  A failed or empty re-read keeps the last-good set and logs the error, so a
  writer that truncates before writing cannot lock every client out; the stat
  cache is left untouched, so the next attempt re-reads and recovers.

  The check sits in route(), on a per-operation authExempt column beside
  bypassSemaphore, and runs BEFORE the semaphore — a refusal costs one SHA-256
  and can never occupy the database slots authenticated clients are waiting for.
  /healthz is the one exemption, because a probe carries no credential;
  /v0/beads/context is not, because it reports the repo root, beads directory
  and database name. Tokens are compared as SHA-256 digests in constant time,
  so the process holds no raw credential and the 401 — fixed detail, via the
  staticDetail map — can never echo the one that was presented.

  The wire says so: a bearerToken securityScheme, a 401 on every guarded
  operation, and a spec-parity test that fails if the route table's exemption
  column and the document's security blocks ever disagree. That test is what
  makes a NEW operation inherit the 401 in the same commit that routes it.

HOST ALLOWLIST

  --allowed-host (repeatable) adds Host values the DNS-rebinding check answers
  to. Matching stays exact; there is no wildcard or suffix syntax. Admitting a
  name the operator enumerated does not weaken the defense: a rebound page
  still cannot make a browser send that Host to 127.0.0.1, and the automation
  clients that do send it are not browsers. Without this, a server reached by
  any name other than a loopback spelling or the bind address 400s on every
  request, which is the first thing a non-loopback deployment trips over.

WHY LOOPBACK BEHAVIOR IS UNCHANGED

  Every new field defaults to the value that reproduces the old code path: no
  Auth, no extra hosts. A zero-valued Config is the previous server, and the
  whole pre-existing test suite proves it — none of those tests passes a token
  or a host, and all of them still pass unmodified.

  The one deliberate behavior change is at the other end: --allow-non-loopback
  now REQUIRES --auth-token-file, escapable only by naming --insecure-no-auth.
  Beyond loopback the old default was that reaching the address granted every
  read and every claim. The three places that advertised "no authentication" —
  the help text, the bind refusal and the flag usage — are reworded, since
  leaving any of them would ship a false security statement.

  Still no TLS, deliberately and unchanged. A non-loopback bind now warns that
  the token and the issue data travel in plaintext and belong inside a trusted
  boundary; supplying confidentiality is the deployment's job.

Agent-Signature: claude-opus-5

Co-authored-by: CI Bot <ci@beads.test>
2026-08-09 18:05:56 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
413887be94
Publish the row-version guard on close, reopen and delete (#5506)
* Publish the row-version guard on close, reopen and delete

`expected_version` already existed on all three roles — `CloseRequest`,
`ReopenRequest` and, since the deleter slice, `DeleteRequest` — and none of
the three published it. `internal/httpapi/close.go` even carried the reason
in a comment ("a precondition would need a frozen conflict code for
ErrVersionMismatch and a `row_version` on the issue body for clients to
echo"). Both of those landed with `updateIssue`'s guarded members:
`precondition_failed` is frozen, `PreconditionFailed()` exists, and
`UpdateIssueResponse.revision` is the token clients echo. This retires the
comment by making it false.

Spec first, then `make api-gen`, then the handlers.

- `closeIssue` and `reopenIssue` take `expected_version` and answer with
  `revision`. The guard is checked BEFORE the idempotent re-close and before
  the non-done no-op, which is the role's own order; `force` bypasses close
  POLICY and never the precondition.
- `deleteIssues` takes `expected_version` under the role's SINGLE-ID rule: a
  guard beside more than one DISTINCT id is a 400 naming the member, refused
  at the edge so the client gets a member name the role's own ErrValidation
  route cannot give it. Duplicates collapse after trimming, matching
  workapi.NormalizeDeleteIDs; a blank id is refused first so the arity rule
  cannot steal a broken list's answer.
- Every precondition arm is matched TYPED and FIRST. ClassifyError has no row
  for ErrVersionMismatch and neither leg wraps it in ErrValidation, so below
  those arms all three would answer a generic 500. Verified by mutation.
- `applyInt64Member` becomes `applyVersionGuardMember` and names the member
  itself: five call sites, one spelling, and no unparam exclusion.

Two tests changed rather than being added to: reopen's "publishes no conflict
code" is now "publishes no POLICY conflict code", written as an exact set, and
`TestDeleteRequestMembersMatchTheHandler` is new — that handler's member list
was hand-rolled with nothing tying it to the document.

Gates: `make api-check`, `go build ./...`, `go vet ./...`, `gofmt -l` clean,
`golangci-lint run` on the touched packages and `--new-from-rev=origin/main`
(0 issues), and `BEADS_TEST_PROXIED_SERVER=1 CGO_ENABLED=1 go test ./cmd/bd/
-run 'TestProxiedServerServeClose|TestProxiedServerServeDelete'` green against
real Dolt. The pre-commit hook's `go run golangci-lint@v2.10.1` fails on this
host with a toolchain mismatch unrelated to this change, so the hook's contents
were run by hand before committing with --no-verify.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Record the compare-and-set rule where the next handler author will look

Five handlers now match ErrVersionMismatch typed before reaching failErr, and
each said why in its own words. That is five coincidences, not a rule: handler
author #6 reads ClassifyError, finds no row for the sentinel, and concludes the
shared mapping covers it.

State it at ClassifyError instead. That function CANNOT build a
precondition_failed — the refusal echoes the value the REQUEST guarded on and
ClassifyError is handed an error alone — so any operation publishing
expected_version, expected_status or expected_assignee must match the sentinel
typed in its own failure path. Forgetting is not a worse 4xx: neither storage
leg wraps these in ErrValidation, so the miss falls through the default arm and
every guard failure on that operation is a generic 500.

The three handlers this stack added now cite that rule rather than restating it.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* lint: the last US spelling in problem.go

main was red on its own Lint job (misspell, locale US) from two words the
release slice added. `neighbour` has since been fixed upstream; `archaeology`
at problem.go:85 is the one left, and the PR workflow lints the whole tree with
only-new-issues: false, so every open PR inherits the failure until it goes.

Not this stack's breakage, and landed here only because this stack is what it
was blocking. Prose only; no behavior.

---------

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 17:02:53 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
38c3564075
claimNext + batchClose + incremental labels: the three role-backed ops with no wire (ga-g3gg8) (#5510)
* Publish POST /v0/beads/issues:claimNext: take ready work atomically (ga-g3gg8)

A client of this surface that wants the next piece of work composes
`GET /v0/beads/ready` with `POST /v0/beads/issues/{id}:claim`. That
composition is a RACE, and it is the reason this operation exists rather than
a round trip saved: between the listing that offered a row and the claim that
asked for it, another agent claims it — so the second agent earns a 409 for a
row it was correctly offered, and a fleet polling one queue spends its
requests losing races instead of doing work.

`claimNextIssue` publishes issueops.ReadyClaimer, where selection, the
compare-and-set that wins the row, and the hydration of the row that was won
are ONE transaction. The row cannot move between being chosen and being
reported.

THE FILTER IS THE LISTING'S, and not a copy of it. The parameters are decoded
by readyFilters — the same function `listReadyWork` and `countReadyWork` share
— because a claim that answered a different question than `bd ready` shows
would hand an agent work the listing never offered it, and two predicates that
are allowed to differ eventually do. The actor is the only body member: it is
provenance that lands in a column, and this surface has always carried that in
a body, while re-spelling the filter as a body object would create exactly the
second expression the shared decoder exists to prevent.
TestClaimNextAdmitsExactlyTheListingsFilters holds the DOCUMENT to the same
identity, since only the handler is protected by sharing the function.

`limit` is refused BY VALUE rather than left to the unknown-parameter rule,
and the distinction is two different client recoveries. `unknown_parameter`
means "this server does not know that name — version skew, degrade or fall
back", which would be false: it is a name this server knows perfectly well on
the sibling listing. It will not ACT on it, which is `invalid_value`, and the
reason is the role's: a claim delivers the one row it wins however large the
pool it scanned, and the scan must stay unbounded or a window that happens to
be full of rows a racing agent already took reports nothing to claim.

`sort` IS published, unlike on `ready:count`, because order decides WHICH row
a claim writes to where it cannot change a cardinality — and it is sent
explicitly for handleReady's reason, which bites harder here: an empty policy
adopts storage's hybrid fallback, and here that changes the row that gets
written rather than the order rows are printed in.

NOTHING ELIGIBLE IS A 200 WITH `claimed` ABSENT. An empty ready front is the
steady state of a drained queue, not a failure, and a polling agent that had
to classify an error to discover it would be pattern-matching prose. There is
no boolean beside the member and no scan count: a second member carrying the
same fact is a second member that can disagree with the first. This is the one
place the operation differs from `issues/{id}:claim`, which 404s an id that
names nothing — that one was asked about a ROW, and this one was asked a
question whose honest answer can be "none".

It documents no 409 and no 404 at all, and both absences are contract. There
is no id to have missed, and a row a racing agent took is simply not in the
set this claim scanned.

The real-Dolt leg asserts the guarantee a fake cannot express: nine concurrent
claimants against six ready rows win six distinct rows and never the same one
twice. The assertion is on duplicates rather than on timing, so it is
deterministic however the goroutines interleave.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Publish patch.add_labels and patch.remove_labels on updateIssue (ga-g3gg8)

The bead asked for "incremental label add/remove on the wire", noting that
labels are replace-only and that issueops.LabelPatch has Add and Remove. The
trace found the situation is narrower than that and more familiar: the role's
whole algebra IS already wire-expressible — as `labels.{replace,add,remove}`
on `issues:batchApply`'s update item, which has published `ApplyLabelPatch`
since it landed. What has no incremental spelling is `PATCH /v0/beads/issues/{id}`,
whose `patch.labels` is a bare array.

That is #5484's finding again, on the one member it did not close: two
operations for patching one issue, disagreeing about what patching one issue
means. This closes the gap from the same side, and this member is the last of
them.

`patch.labels` KEEPS ITS SHAPE, and that is a constraint rather than a
preference. Nesting it into an object the way `ApplyPatchBody` does would
RE-TYPE a published member, which is the one kind of change this document has
no additive route for — `## Profiles` names re-typing explicitly as not a
tightening, and the only remedies written down are a new optional member or
cutting /v1. So the increments arrive as two flat siblings, which is the shape
`notes` and `append_notes` already use for the same replace/increment pair on
this exact schema.

THEY ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE WITH `labels`, and that is the difference from
that pair. The role defines an ORDER over all three — replace, then add, then
remove, so removal wins — so a request carrying all three has a defined result
and must reach the role whole. Notes have no such algebra, so there the two
members are a contradiction and are refused. The handler assembles one
LabelPatch in one loop for exactly this reason: a member decoded into its own
patch value would overwrite the others' fields and the last one decoded would
silently win.

The retired premise is worth stating, because it was written down and it was
half right. `patch.labels` said incremental edits were deferred because
"replacement is the only shape whose result the client already knows without a
read-back". That holds for a writer that knows it is alone and fails for every
other one: two agents each adding a tag to one row, each composing a
replacement from a read taken before the other wrote, silently drop each
other's label. `bd label add` and every agent that tags work concurrently are
that caller. The real-Dolt leg is written as exactly that scenario.

The length bound applies to all three members including `remove_labels`, where
a value the column could not hold could never have been stored: it is a rule
about what a label may BE, and the role refuses it there too and writes
nothing, so the edge refuses it where the 400 can name the member and the
index.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Publish POST /v0/beads/issues:batchClose: close many, keep the survivors (ga-g3gg8)

`bd close a b c` is one transaction and one history entry. Over this surface it
has been N calls to `POST /v0/beads/issues/{id}:close`, which is N transactions
and N history entries, with no way for a caller to say it wanted them together.
The request is the transaction boundary, which is the whole reason
issueops.BatchCloser is a role rather than a loop.

IT IS THE ONE OPERATION HERE WHOSE 200 CARRIES REFUSALS, and that shape is the
ROLE's rather than an arrangement of it. An id the batch turns down is skipped
and the survivors commit, because an agent that finishes four of five steps and
mistypes the fifth should keep the four — so a per-item refusal is a RESULT of
the batch, not an error of it. `batchCreateIssues` is the deliberate opposite
and has said so in its own document since it landed: half a created plan cannot
be re-sent without duplicating the half that landed.

The division that falls out is the contract a client codes against, and it is
stated on both sides: a NON-2xx means the batch NEVER RAN, and a per-item
`code` means that item did not land while others may have.

`code` ON AN OUTCOME IS `Problem.code`'s VOCABULARY, restricted to `not_found`
and `not_closable`. A second vocabulary was the alternative and it was refused:
an item refusal and a request refusal are the same question asked at two
scopes, so a client made to learn two spellings would be classifying the SCOPE
rather than the condition. `open_children` keeps both of its readings, and both
are the single close's: present-and-a-count on a success (the number a forced
close bypassed, reported even for an idempotent re-close), and PRESENCE as the
discriminator between the two `not_closable` refusals on a failure, exactly as
on a problem document.

The projection fails CLOSED. An item error no arm recognizes becomes a refusal
carrying the generic code, never a success — because a success with no row is a
shape a client cannot tell from a real close, and a `default` that fell through
would produce exactly that.

NO COMPOSED CLAIM, and the omission is reasoned rather than partial. The role
can claim the next ready issue in the same transaction once the closes land;
publishing that member would need a second, BODY-shaped spelling of the ready
filter vocabulary that `GET /v0/beads/ready` and the `issues:claimNext` landing
beside this one both express as query parameters — and two spellings of one
predicate eventually disagree, which is the reason ReadyClaimer.Filter is the
listing's own request type. A client that wants both sends two requests and
loses the single transaction, which is a real loss and is named in the document
rather than papered over. It is additive later.

The per-item id is bounded HERE, which the single close gets from the
custom-method dispatcher and this operation has no dispatcher to get it from. It
is a 400 rather than a per-item `not_found`, because it is a statement about the
REQUEST and because reporting it as a miss would let a caller map this server's
notion of a well-formed id.

The real-Dolt leg asserts the claim the whole shape rests on: a batch whose
middle item names nothing still commits the two either side of it, each with its
OWN reason — read back through the CLI rather than off the response the batch
composed. A fake cannot state that, because it holds no rows to roll back.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Scope the label members' no-op wording to the labels (ga-g3gg8)

`add_labels` and `remove_labels` each said a no-op edit "reports
`changed: false`". That is the RESPONSE's member and it describes the whole
patch, so it is only true of a request whose sole content was the no-op edit —
a request that also moved a title changed the row and reports true.

They now say what is true of the member: the edit changes no labels. The
response's reading is stated once beside it, as a fact about the patch.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix two misspell findings inherited from the release merge (ga-lzcuv)

`main` is red on Lint as of 294af94be2, and both findings are prose from that
squash rather than from anything in this branch:

  internal/httpapi/problem.go:85  `archaeology` -> misspell wants `archeology`
  internal/httpapi/problem.go:591 `neighbour`   -> misspell wants `neighbor`

`.golangci.yml` sets `misspell.locale: US`, so both are real under this
repository's configuration. They are fixed here because this branch merges next
and would otherwise carry a red Lint of its own making no changes to earn.

`neighbour` takes the US spelling. `archaeology` is REWORDED to `excavation`
rather than respelled: `archeology` is the spelling the linter wants and the
one most readers would read as a typo, and the sentence loses nothing by not
having the word in it. Rewording is the only one of the two options that leaves
the comment saying what it meant without looking wrong.

Neither is reachable from the local pre-commit hook, which fails at
golangci-lint config load in this environment before it analyses a file.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 16:02:52 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
294af94be2
Publish POST /v0/beads/issues/{id}:release: give a claim back (ga-lzcuv) (#5507)
* Publish POST /v0/beads/issues/{id}:release: give a claim back (ga-lzcuv)

The claim has had a wire since v0 and its inverse has had none. `bd unclaim`
is a subprocess for every client of this surface, and a release-if-current has
no route at all — so the one verb that frees stranded work is the one verb an
automation client cannot reach.

`releaseIssue` publishes issueops.Releaser whole: `actor`, the
`expected_assignee` compare-and-set, and `force`. The response carries the
issue, `changed`, and `revision` — the last for `updateIssue`'s reason, and
one of its own: a release REMINTS the row's token by design, so a caller that
guarded its next write on a version read before the release would miss, and
this member is the only place the new one exists.

THE REFUSAL CODES ARE THREE, AND ONLY ONE IS NEW.

`already_claimed` is the ownership fence — an unforced, unguarded release by
an actor that is not the holder. That is `updateIssue`'s assignee-fence
situation exactly, down to having two bypasses, so it takes that operation's
code rather than a fourth spelling of "a live foreign owner refused your
write". Like there, no `assignee` member: the fence refuses without naming the
holder, so absence means re-read the row.

`precondition_failed` is the guard, inherited from the same operation and
carrying the same members for the same reason — `expected_assignee` is the
REQUEST's value, and there is no `actual_assignee` beside it, because the
refusal rolled its transaction back and ErrAssigneeMismatch is a bare sentinel
that formats the holder it saw into prose. There is no ClaimConflictError
equivalent to read, and this surface does not scrape its own messages.

`not_releasable` is minted, covering ErrNotReleasable and ErrNotClaimed.
`not_claimable` is the nearest existing code and covers a superset of the same
statuses today, but the coincidence is not a contract — the release transition
is pinned to {open, in_progress} by releasableStatus and the claim's
eligibility is a separate predicate — and for the unheld half the reuse would
be an outright lie: an open, unassigned row is the most claimable row a
workspace has. The two conditions share ONE code with no discriminating
member, which is the narrow choice rather than the convenient one: neither
sentinel carries a typed observation, and splitting later is an ADDITION the
document already tells clients to tolerate, while merging two published codes
is the removal that breaks the wire.

IT IS NOT IDEMPOTENT, and the wire says so rather than inventing an answer the
role refused to give. An unheld row is 409, never a 200 carrying
`changed: false` — that value is one no role produces (ReleaseResult.Changed
is true on every non-error answer), and it would report one answer for "I
released this twice", "a reaper beat me to it" and "nothing ever claimed it",
because the post-state is anonymous and nothing is left on the row to tell
them apart. A client for which "already released" is the ordinary path maps
the code to success in one line it writes knowingly.

`expected_assignee` disagrees with `updateIssue`'s same-named member in
exactly one place, and the schema says so: the empty string is a 400 here
rather than a guard meaning "expected unassigned". It also documents what the
comparison ACTUALLY does — separator-insensitive over runs of `.`/`_`/`-`,
per actorMatches, and nothing else forgiven — rather than repeating the role
doc's "byte for byte", which the implementation stopped being at ga-5ksp5.

failRelease matches all four sentinels TYPED and BEFORE its ErrValidation and
ErrNotFound arms. None of them is wrapped in ErrValidation on any leg, so
below a generic arm every one would have been a 500 on every leg.

The real-Dolt leg asserts the property a fake cannot: after every refusal it
reads the row back through the CLI, so "nothing was written" — and above all
the CLAIM SURVIVING a wrong-holder refusal — is a fact about the stored row.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Fix the release document's three review findings (ga-lzcuv)

The mint stands; what the review caught is that the document was written as
though `not_releasable` meant one thing, and it means two.

THE SAFETY ONE. "A caller for which 'already released' is the ordinary path
treats that code as success" was true of the sentinel it was written against
and is FALSE of the code it shipped as. `not_releasable` also covers the
status refusal, and a row parked in a status this workspace configured is
refused WHILE STILL ASSIGNED — so a reaper following that sentence books a
claim as dropped while it stands, held by an agent that is already gone, with
nothing left to free it. That is the stranding this operation resolves ids
across both planes to prevent, reintroduced through the refusal vocabulary
instead of through the id.

It now says the opposite, in the operation description and again on the 409:
on `not_releasable`, READ THE ROW. The row carries the one fact that separates
the two — an assignee, or none. One extra request on an uncommon path is the
honest price of one code rather than two, and the handler's `detail` says so
too, since that is the string an operator actually reads.

THE ACCURACY ONE. CodeNotReleasable claimed "neither refusal is typed", which
is wrong and misleads the person who eventually splits it: ErrNotClaimed and
ErrNotReleasable are two distinct typed sentinels and failRelease holds both
in one case arm, so a split is a mapping change in that arm — no archaeology
and no prose-scraping. What is genuinely unavailable typed is the OBSERVATION
each refusal made, the status seen and the emptiness of the assignee, which is
why the code carries no extension member. That is a narrower claim than the
one the comment made, and it is the true one. The merge is recorded as what it
is: a deliberate start-narrow choice, kept because adding a code later is the
reversible direction.

THE WIDENING. The 200 now states it: the transition is defined over `open` AND
`in_progress`, so a row already open that STILL HOLDS AN ASSIGNEE is released
here — the state a partial write or an out-of-band status edit leaves behind,
and one a release-if-current guarding on `in_progress` did nothing for and
reported no error about. A client porting such a guard has to know that before
it ports one.

Beside it, the code-to-outcome mapping a release-if-current client wants, so
that mapping is written against a documented fact: `not_releasable`,
`precondition_failed`, `already_claimed` and `404` all mean "no release
happened, and that is not an error" — `(false, nil)` to a client spelling it
as a pair. With the reading that pair does NOT license, stated beside it,
because it is the same reading the safety finding is about: it means no
release happened, never that the claim is gone.

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 14:41:28 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
93924f1226
Publish updateIssue's guarded members: status, assignee, parent_id, metadata (#5484)
`PATCH /v0/beads/issues/{id}` documented four exclusions and gave one
reason for all of them: status belongs to close/reopen/claim, assignee to
the claim's compare-and-set, metadata deserves its own design pass,
parent_id is a graph edit in patch clothing — and keeping them out was
"half the reason this operation documents no 409 at all."

That held until `issues:batchApply` landed, whose update item publishes
`status`, `assignee`, both force flags and all three `expected_*` guards,
and says of itself that it patches one issue "under PATCH's rules plus the
preconditions and force flags that operation deliberately does not
publish." Two operations for patching one issue, disagreeing about what
patching one issue means. This closes the gap from the other side.

`patch` grows `status`, `assignee`, `parent_id` and `metadata` — the last
reusing `ApplyMetadataPatch` and `applyMetadataPatch()` themselves, not a
second spelling of the replace/merge/set/unset algebra. Beside `patch` the
request grows `expected_version`, `expected_status`, `expected_assignee`,
`force_close_policy` and `force_assignee_transfer`.

The conflicts follow the members, and every one is inherited rather than
invented: close policy's `not_closable` from `status`, the assignee fence's
`already_claimed` from `assignee`, the graph's `dependency_cycle` and
`dependency_exists` from `parent_id`, and `precondition_failed` from the
guard trio. failUpdate matches all of them TYPED and BEFORE its
ErrValidation and ErrNotFound arms, which is the correctness of this
change: the reparent and precondition bodies return raw on one leg and
wrapped on another, so without that order one condition would have answered
500 on the unit-of-work leg and 400 on the store legs.

`UpdateIssueResponse` gains `revision`. `expected_version` guards an opaque
token, `types.Issue.RowVersion` is json:"-" so no read on this surface
publishes one, and a guard whose token no response carries is a guard a
caller cannot fill. A read-modify-write loop now composes its next
expectation from the value the write answered with.

A `patch.parent_id` naming the issue itself is refused at the edge — the
child is the id in the path, so the request contradicts itself with no
state read, and the two legs of the role disagree about which error they
raise for it. A new parent that names nothing stays a 400, conforming to
dependencies:add; the 404 remains the path id's alone.

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 10:24:36 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
b138fb08ef
Publish POST /v0/beads/issues: the single create, with the whole vocabulary (#5483)
`bd serve` could create issues only in batches, and only nine members of
one. `POST /v0/beads/issues:batchCreate`'s item has no `status`, no
`sender`, no `metadata`, no `ephemeral`, no `no_history` and no `id`, so a
caller composing a real row could not use it — the R1 lesson
`issues:batchApply` already learned when its create item published the
whole create vocabulary instead.

This is the single-issue create over `issueops.Lifecycle.Create`, on the
plain collection POST the batch deliberately left free by spelling itself
as a custom method. Its issue members are `ApplyCreateItem`'s exactly,
minus that schema's two plan-only members, plus the edge vocabulary that
operation moves into `dep_add` items: `parent_id`,
`inherit_labels_from_parent`, `dependencies` (typed edges, `reverse`
included) and `waits_for`.

Two conflict codes, both inherited rather than invented. `already_exists`
arrives with the explicit `id`, which the batch publishes none of.
`dependency_cycle` arrives with `parent_id` and `dependencies[].reverse`:
the first places the new row in a hierarchy the caller cannot see, the
second writes an edge INTO the id being minted, and between them a create
can close a cycle for the first time. There is no 404 — a target that
names nothing is a statement about the request body, not about a resource
this operation was asked to address — and no `dependency_exists`, because
the only type conflict a create can raise is between two edges of the same
request.

checkedLifecycle.Create stops passing through. It could, while no handler
on this surface reached it; handleCreateIssue writes *result.Issue onto the
wire, so a provider-supplied role answering nil with a nil error was a
panic on a live server.

`created_at`, `created_by`, `spec_id`, the await/molecule/event plumbing
and `IDPrefix` stay unpublished; the PR body carries the decision and the
evidence for each.

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 09:21:56 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
e9e2c49431
Add issueops.BatchApplier: one plan, one transaction (#5480)
* Add issueops.BatchApplier: one plan, one transaction

A heterogeneous, ORDERED list of creates, updates, closes and edges applied
as one durable act. Each of BatchCreator, BatchCloser and DependencyEditor is
one verb repeated, so a caller that needs two of them needs two transactions
with a window in between; this role's unit is a PLAN.

The role, the two bodies, both decorators and the accessors on every
implementer. The wire half and the conformance contract land beside this.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Close the empty-commit-message hole a no-op batch could open

ApplyBatchCommitMessage now reads the write as well as the result. The counts
are ItemResult.Changed, which is what a CALLER observes; a request can still
write a durable row with every count at zero — a same-type edge re-add
rewrites that edge row's metadata, a re-close can settle blocked state. An
empty message for one of those is an unlabelled Dolt commit on the store legs
and a rollback of a real write on the unit-of-work leg.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Give BatchApplier the contract its two bodies justify

Thirty-nine cases over three legs and TWO independent bodies — the store legs
share issueops.ApplyBatchInTx, the unit-of-work leg cannot reach it, and the
contract header says so rather than claiming three backends agree.

The end-gate case is the one that could not have been written before: every
edge in it is legal when it is written, and only a re-validation against the
closure the whole request produced refuses the pair.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Publish batchApply on v0, and delete batchCreate's false promise

The spec first, the types from it, the handler against the types. The item
union is a TAGGED single-shape object rather than a oneOf, because the
document's x-go-type doctrine forbids composition keywords; the create item
publishes sender, metadata, status, ephemeral and no_history, none of which
batchCreateIssues has — which is why no measured caller could use that one.

The wire result stays lean: ids, changed and a revision. The hydrated
snapshot on the Go contract is what the completion hooks consume, and hooks
never fire on this surface.

OQ2: batchCreateIssues' description claimed a dependency target could name an
earlier item of the same batch. It never could — the server mints the ids and
a wire item has no name — so the paragraph is deleted rather than qualified.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Partition the two new dependency probes on the recorder's surface

The gate halves BatchApplier re-runs are repository PROBES — an ancestry walk
and a reachability walk — so recordingDepUC declares neither and the parity
test has to say so out loud rather than let embedding answer for it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Teach the proxied topology's capability golden about batchApply

The one expectation stored as data outside the package whose gates would
otherwise have caught it — which is what its own header warns about.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Restore the CAS hook case, mint 409 already_exists, and stop over-claiming

Three fixes from review.

The rebase that brought MetadataCAS in left `case *hookMetadataCAS:` with an
EMPTY BODY: a Go type switch does not fall through, so RoleFiresHooks answered
FALSE for it and #5473's Listen refusal was silently disarmed. The compiler,
vet, lint and CI all pass on that. The case is restored and — because it had no
precondition of its own, which is why nothing caught it — serve_source_test now
pins CAS the way it pins the other four, with its peel assertion.

An occupied explicit create id becomes 409 already_exists rather than 400. The
body is well-formed and stays well-formed; what refuses it is state the client
must READ, and recovery is to look at that state. A dead 409 retires for free
where a narrowed 400 breaks clients.

Two headers claimed all three legs share the store body — every clause false,
one citing the contract header as agreeing when it says the opposite — and the
plan file gave a placement reason that is MetadataCAS's, not this role's. The
end-gate claim in ADDING_AN_ISSUEOPS_ROLE.md is narrowed to the true thing: the
two LEAF checks are shared, the orchestration around them forks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Give the scheduling-edge set one definition, in types

Four packages walked {blocks, conditional-blocks, parent-child} under four
names — isSchedulingEdge, isSchedulingDep, isSchedulingDependency, and the
isApplySchedulingEdge this branch added as the fourth. Adding a fifth
scheduling type was four edits with nothing to catch a missed one.

It goes in internal/types rather than the issueops leaf the review named,
because internal/storage/issueops imports internal/storage/domain, so domain
cannot import back and two of the four copies would have survived there. Beside
the Dep* constants themselves, every walker reaches it: nine call sites, one
definition, one edit for a fifth type.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 06:59:34 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
9a2c918b0e
Admit the ephemeral plane from a list request, on the facade and on the wire (#5476)
* feat(reader): admit the ephemeral plane from a list request

`issueops.Reader.Ready` has had an ephemeral gate since it was written;
`List` has not. The wisp plane was reachable from a list request only as
a SIDE EFFECT of `IncludeInfra`, which also drops the infra-type
exclusions, or by naming an infra type, which routes to that plane
ALONE. A caller that wants the ephemeral rows of ordinary types — a
message bead, say — could ask for them on the ready query and not on the
listing, and the wire said so in prose: listIssues published no
`include_ephemeral`, and the document called the asymmetry out.

ListRequest.IncludeEphemeral closes it, with the same semantics
ReadyRequest.IncludeEphemeral already has.

  false (zero value)  durable rows only — today's listing, unchanged
  true                the wisp plane merged IN ADDITION; the answer is a
                      superset of the false answer under the same
                      filters, and never ephemeral-only
  WispType            a predicate on the wisp_type COLUMN, which BOTH
                      tables carry, so it selects no plane: it narrows
                      whatever was admitted. WispType alone answers with
                      nothing, since no durable row carries a
                      classification; WispType + IncludeEphemeral is
                      lawful and composes as an ordinary AND
  order               ONE order across both planes, by SortBy, as if
                      they were a single table — not durable rows
                      followed by ephemeral ones. A Limit truncates the
                      merged order, and the keyset position is applied
                      to BOTH legs, so a cursored walk over the merge
                      drops no row and repeats none. The non-snapshot
                      caveat is the one every multi-page walk already
                      has; the ephemeral plane only turns over faster
  --ready             CARRIED, not dropped. The ready query has an
                      ephemeral gate of its own, so
                      ReadyFilterFromIssueFilter now reads the plane bit
                      off the list filter. That also carries
                      IncludeInfra's plane half, which the projection
                      used to drop silently — `bd list --ready
                      --include-infra` now answers with the wisps `bd
                      count --include-infra` already counts

It is a PLANE knob and not a TYPE knob, which is the whole difference
from the three fields beside it: templates, gates and infra types stay
hidden by their own predicates. IncludeInfra remains strictly wider.

The wire gets `include_ephemeral` on listIssues, spec-first. There is no
capability-token change: it is an ordinary optional query parameter, so
an older server answers it with 400 `unknown_parameter` — the designed
skew signal, whose recovery is to degrade rather than retry.

Conformance runs on all three legs (server-backed store, embedded store,
unit of work) and covers admission, the merged order, every page bound
across the interleaving, a cursored walk across the plane boundary, and
the WispType interaction. The two seams arrange the merge differently —
one merge-sorts two independently ordered legs in Go and trims, the
other ORDERs a SQL UNION ALL — so the bounded and cursored arms are a
genuine two-body case rather than one body twice.

* fix(reader): correct the flag's reach, and settle the merge seam it lands on

Review follow-up. Three of these are documentation being wrong about the
code; one is the code itself.

THE MOTIVATING EXAMPLE WAS FALSE. `message` is one of the DEFAULT INFRA
TYPES (agent, role, message), so "the ephemeral rows of ordinary types —
a message bead, say" named the one row this flag cannot reach: the
infra-type exclusion is a TYPE predicate and survives the plane knob, as
the golden already recorded and nothing asserted. `bd ready` cannot
deliver it either — ReadyWorkExcludeTypes appends the infra set
unconditionally. The field doc, the operation description and the
parameter text now say that ephemeral agent/role/message rows need
IncludeInfra, and what the flag alone reaches is the ephemeral rows of
the types a listing already shows.

The contract case is what makes it more than a corrected sentence. The
fixture's only wisp was a task, which comes back under EITHER knob, so a
body that wired the plane flag to IncludeInfra's branch answered every
row correctly. An infra-typed wisp is hidden twice over — once by the
plane, once by the type — and is the only row that can tell the two
apart. Three rows now pin it: absent under IncludeEphemeral, present
under IncludeInfra, present under both. Wiring the flag into the
type branch fails it.

TWO MORE DOC CORRECTIONS on the same field. It admits the wisps TABLE,
which holds no-history rows (ephemeral = 0) alongside true ephemerals —
stated, rather than left as "the ephemeral plane". And it is NOT
identical to ReadyRequest.IncludeEphemeral: ready reads both planes
either way and adds a per-ROW ephemeral predicate when unset, where this
selects which TABLES are read. The difference is observable on exactly
those no-history rows, which a DEFAULT ready answer already contains and
a default listing does not.

The ready projection's predicate is negative, on a field whose zero
value means admit, so it fires for a filter that merely never set
SkipWisps rather than for one that asked. Every caller is handed a
BuildListFilter result, which decides that field for every request, so
"unset" is unreachable today — named at the site so the next hand-built
filter does not walk into it.

THE SEAM DISAGREEMENT, which is the code change. A cross-plane duplicate
id was tolerated by the per-table seam (collapse to the canonical wisp,
answer) and HARD-ERRORED by the union seam, and this flag routes every
wisp-inclusive read onto the union. Two implementations of one role
answering a page and an error is a divergence, not a design, and leaving
it silent while making it reachable is worse than either behavior.

The union now resolves it the way its sibling does, at all four sites,
and the strict flag is gone rather than left as a footgun. Three things
say that is the right verdict and not merely the convenient one: the
per-table seam has said so since be-iabdi ("hard-erroring breaks every
lookup city-wide"); `bd doctor` detects the state with a query of its
own, so answering blinds no detector; and its fix deletes the stale
ISSUES copy, which is exactly the row the union now drops. Its own check
text names the hard failure as the damage — "stale issues-table copies
break every lookup for the affected IDs". The four tests that pinned the
error now pin the wisp-canonical answer; inverting the preference fails
all four.

Preferring the wisp needs a second pass: the outer ORDER BY can place
either copy first, so which leg produced a row is known in full only
after the scan.

Last, a stale comment: issueops/count.go claimed SearchIssuesInTx was
the corruption detector. It has not been one since be-iabdi. The count
trusts the disjoint-table invariant and no read enforces it, so a
dual-resident id is counted twice and listed once; doctor is the
detector and the repair.

---------

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
2026-08-09 05:06:36 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
1a1431be3f
Add issueops.MetadataCAS: compare-and-set over one metadata key (#5473)
* Add issueops.MetadataCAS: compare-and-set over one metadata key

The one coordination primitive missing at every layer. Everything the
metadata plane holds is written through Lifecycle.Update, which has no way
to say "only if", so every caller that needs a guarded write composes a
transaction, a read and an update by hand — and each one has to get the
composition right. Gas City emulates it client-side with RunInTransaction +
GetIssue + UpdateIssue for exactly that reason, and the comment it left
behind names the gap: "the upstream storage layer exposes no
conditional-UPDATE ... WHERE primitive".

The role is a state transition stated as a pair. Expected is the key's value
before, Value is its value after, and nil on either side means the key is
ABSENT there: a conditional create is (nil -> value), a conditional delete
is (value -> nil), and a caller that can take a lease can return it to the
state its own acquire tests for. Equality is canonical, so a caller cannot
lose a swap to its own formatter; numbers compare as their source literal,
because decoding through float64 equates two int64s past 2^53 and that is
the silent false match a compare-and-set exists to prevent.

A MISMATCH IS AN ANSWER, not an error: Swapped false, Current carrying the
value that refused it, nil error. That is the one place this diverges from
PROPOSAL-cas-conditional-update.md, which specifies a typed error and a loud
non-zero exit for the assignee/status guards. Its argument is a CLI one — a
swallowed refusal in a shell script is the bug class it was written for —
and a non-zero exit is the front door's enforcement, which the HTTP handler
here still owes and pays. The role's designed caller is a retry loop, for
which a lost race is the ordinary path, and an error cannot hand back
Current without a bespoke type every caller must errors.As before it can
read the one field it needs.

All three legs share one body (internal/storage/issueops), so this is one
reading plus two wrapper checks rather than three backends agreeing. The
wrapper check earned its keep: the unit-of-work leg rolled an ephemeral swap
back, because the shared body reported "no durable tables changed" and that
leg's commit message is what commits the SQL transaction as well as what
versions it. MetadataCASWrite now carries the two facts separately.

The HTTP half lands with the role per the 2026-08-05 scope decision:
POST /v0/beads/issues/{id}:casMetadata, spec first. A lost race is a 200
carrying swapped:false, so the operation has no conflict code; an omitted
`expected`/`value` member means absent and a member holding null is a value,
which is why the handler reads raw members.

No bd command yet: the primary consumer is an embedder, and a CLI front door
is additive. No .golangci.yml entry, for the reason memoryops gives — the
body is an …InTx function no front door can reach.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Review: read Current from the row, and let a client read a present null

Two shape fixes, both of which would have been expensive to change after
anyone depended on them.

A *json.RawMessage wire member cannot READ a present null: encoding/json
nils the pointer before UnmarshalJSON runs, so a generated client decoding
{"swapped":false,"current":null} gets the same value it gets for an omitted
member — and on this operation those mean opposite things. A retry loop
against a null-valued key would read "absent", swap with expected omitted,
mismatch, and livelock on a stream of 200s. x-go-type-skip-optional-pointer
makes the member a bare json.RawMessage, which is an Unmarshaler and
receives the literal; the wire is unchanged in both directions, which is
exactly why nothing else catches the regression, so the decode is now
pinned. nullable: true beside it, for the validating gateway in front of
somebody's server.

The number rule was defended in three places as protecting int64s past 2^53
from a float64 round-trip. It protects nothing: the metadata column decodes
through float64 itself — measured, 9007199254740993 stores as ...992, 1.0 as
1, -0.0 as 0, 1e300 as three hundred and one digits. The false justification
is gone from all three sites and replaced with what the probe actually
showed, plus the guidance it implies: compose an Expected from a previous
Current, and prefer a string for a coordination token.

That guidance was not true yet, because Current was the REQUEST's bytes
rather than the row's — so "what you get is what a later read sees" was
false, and a loop feeding Current back compared its own spelling against the
substrate's forever. Current is now re-read inside the deciding transaction
on every path. One extra SELECT, one statable invariant.

Three contract cases, each watched to fail: Current is the column's bytes
and a Current-driven loop converges (mutant: answer from the plan);
the history entry names the request's actor, counted per actor because
created_at is second-granularity and an ORDER BY decided this case on a coin
toss when it was first written (mutant: stamp a constant); a wisp swap
writes no durable event row, which two layers had been holding by
coincidence with nothing asserting either.

Also: the serializer-omits-null footgun in the spec (an absent `value` is a
DELETE, and Jackson/Pydantic/omitempty all omit nulls by default),
canonicalizeForContract's own float64 blind spot named in the coverage
paragraph, and the leaf now says corrupt stored metadata is an untyped error
— a 500 — because the request was well formed and the issue exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Close the three capability holes CI found, and one my sweep could not

All three are the same shape: a surface that loses the new role silently,
and none of them is reachable from the package tests I ran locally.

internal/storage/uow's notifying wrapper is the important one. Its
recordingIssueUC inherited CompareAndSetMetadataKey from the embedded use
case, so a swap through a notifying unit of work recorded nothing and the
hook the DoltStorage chain fires for the same write was lost. Its
notifyingProvider did not answer MetadataCAS at all, so a caller's type
assertion simply stopped matching and the wrapper dropped the capability
along with its hooks. Both are now declared, and the recorder reads the
use case's own "a row write landed" rather than inferring it from the
request — which is strictly better than what the hook decorator can do, and
snapshots anyPlane because this role resolves a wisp id itself.

cmd/bd's serveIdentityStore is the second stub store to nil-panic on the
promoted accessor, after serveRolesStore in the same commit. And
serve_proxied_integration_test.go carries a SECOND hardcoded capabilities
golden, whose own comment says two literals that must match are one literal
— it was right, and it was still missed.

My local sweep ran the metadata-cas contract on all three legs but not the
whole internal/storage/uow package, which takes nine minutes; that is where
the parity guards live. Ran it whole this time.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: name the step with no number — the surfaces that EMBED

A new accessor arrives on every embedder promoted rather than declared, so
the build stays green and the first symptom is a nil dereference in somebody
else's stub. Four such places caught this role after its own slice was
green: RoleFiresHooks, both halves of uow's notifying wrapper, and two
cmd/bd stub stores. Grep for the embed, not for the interface — and run
internal/storage/uow whole, because the parity guards live there and the
package takes nine minutes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Review Sim <ci@beads.test>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 04:15:34 -07:00
CI Bot
19e4af709a feat(httpapi): stream the events journal over SSE (bd-opisf)
GET /v0/beads/events:watch holds a text/event-stream response open and emits
each committed mutation as it lands, so a consumer learns about a write when it
happens instead of on its next interval. It is a SIBLING of the paged read, not
a mode of it: `follow=true` would have given one operationId two media types,
two lifetimes, two limit rules and two capacity stories, and a client generated
from the document could not have described either.

THE CURSOR IS STILL THE CONTRACT, which is what makes this cheap to publish.
The server keeps no per-consumer state and remembers no subscription; a stream
is the `since` reads a poller would have performed, performed on its behalf
against the same ReadEventsJournalPage through the same read-only cursor. Every
event carries `id: <seq>`, so the checkpoint a client holds while streaming is
the number it would have held while polling, and `Last-Event-ID` — the header a
browser's EventSource resends by itself — takes exactly the value `since` takes.
That header WINS over the parameter, because the client that sends it did not
choose to: an EventSource reconnects to the URL it was built with, so honoring
`since` there would replay every record since the consumer started, on every
reconnect, forever. A nonempty unparseable one is a 400 naming the header rather
than a silent fallback, which would start a stream somewhere the client did not
ask for and never tell it; an EMPTY one means "no id yet" and defers to `since`,
because a client that always sets the header sends it empty on its first
connect and refusing that would break the request the header exists to serve.
Delivery is at-least-once against the client's own checkpoint: exactly once and
in order within a stream, duplicates only across a reconnect. No engine or
storage change — this consumes the poll read path.

EVERY REFUSAL IS DECIDED BEFORE THE FIRST BYTE — validation, the disabled 409,
the flush check, the stream cap, and then the first read, which is what turns a
pruned-past cursor into the paged read's own 410 rather than a 200 that
immediately reports its own failure. Exactly one failure can arrive after the
status is spent: a prune racing an open stream, emitted as a NAMED `truncated`
event carrying the 410's own body in the same encoding on one line (asserted
against Write's output, not merely agreeing with it), behind a raised `retry`
and followed by a close. Naming only the exception is what lets a bare
`onmessage` consumer treat an unrecognized event as "stop, this is not a
record"; one that ignores it does not lose records silently, it stalls loudly on
connect-time 410s, slowly. The other unreportable failure — a stored payload
that will not encode — ends the stream too, and names its seq in the log,
because it will end every stream that reaches that row and nothing else would
say which one it is.

THREE LIMITS HAD TO MOVE, and the middle one is the trap.

  - requestDeadline (60s) does not apply to a streaming row. For every other
    operation it is the backstop against a request holding resources forever;
    here it would do nothing but sever the stream. Each READ carries a 15s
    deadline instead — a liveness budget rather than a database one, since it
    also bounds how long a stream can go without a heartbeat and how long it can
    ignore a shutdown.
  - http.Server.ReadTimeout (30s) had to be cleared per request, BEFORE the
    connect read. There is no WriteTimeout on this server — statusWriter rolls a
    deadline forward before every write, which bounds one stalled write rather
    than a stream, and needs nothing here — but ReadTimeout is a deadline on the
    WHOLE request, and net/http keeps a background read running while a handler
    writes: the read that notices a disconnect. Its expiry cancels the request
    context, so an idle stream would end itself at thirty seconds with no client
    involved, and a database wedged during the connect read would be booked as
    `client_closed`. Clearing it costs no disconnect detection — a client that
    leaves still produces a read error — and a peer that vanishes without a FIN
    is reaped by TCP keepalive, which Go's listener enables by default
    (measured: 15s idle, 15s interval, 9 probes; ~150s).
  - The database slot moves from the request to the read. Sixteen slots and
    forty-eight stream places means one slot per open stream would let a handful
    of idle consumers starve every other operation for hours with /healthz
    green; a stream now takes a slot for the moment of each poll and gives it
    back, and slot pressure delays a pass instead of ending a stream.

Streams are capped at 48, SIXTEEN BELOW the 64-connection limit, and the gap is
load-bearing arithmetic rather than caution: LimitListener returns a connection
slot only when the connection closes, which is after the handler returned and
after this counter came down, so a cap at maxConns could never be observed — the
connect that should earn the 503 would never be accepted, and neither would the
poll it is told to fall back to, nor a mutation, nor a fresh-connection
/healthz. The headroom makes the refusal deliverable; `events_watch_admitted`
carries the live gauge on every connect so accumulation is visible before the
cliff. Each stream jitters its own poll phase by ±10%, because consumers
reconnect together after a restart on one shared `retry` and a fixed interval
would march them into a single read burst per second forever. And a graceful
shutdown signals its streams (RegisterOnShutdown) rather than waiting them out;
the loop consults that signal and the client on EVERY pass, including the
draining ones, so a week-old backlog stays cancellable within one batch.

Tests: handler-level over live delivery (mutations land AFTER the connect),
id=seq, heartbeats, Last-Event-ID precedence including a stale header against a
live `since` and the empty-header polarity, the 400/409/410 connect legs, a
prune under an open stream, the cap and its 503, the cap's headroom against
maxConns, backlog drains cancelled by both a hangup and a shutdown, slot release
on every exit, a stream sharing a single-slot semaphore with a paged read, the
flusher refusal, the read-deadline clear and its ordering against the connect
read, jitter spread, and a clean drain with a stream open — all under -race.
Framing is pinned against a record whose payload carries literal newlines, a CR
and a `data:` line of its own. Two e2e legs through a real `bd serve`: mutate on
one connection while streaming on another under a 10s arrival bound, then
reconnect with Last-Event-ID and require the resume, plus the disabled refusal.
Mutated and each caught: the mid-stream truncated event, Last-Event-ID
precedence, the empty-header polarity, the cap decrement, the cap's headroom,
the drain-cancel fast path, the read-deadline clear and its ordering, the poll
jitter, the shutdown exit, and the deadline exemption.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agent-Signature: claude-code-claude-opus-5[1m]-unknown-reasoning on behalf of julianknutsen
2026-08-09 07:55:23 +00:00
CI Bot
7992c00702 feat(httpapi): publish the events journal on the v0 surface (bd-opisf)
GET /v0/beads/events pages the durable mutation journal from a caller-held
checkpoint, so a hosted consumer stops shelling out to `bd events tail`. The
journal and its retention contract already landed; this is the consumption
surface for them.

THE RECORDS ARE THE CLI'S RECORDS, and that is a machine fact rather than a
promise. The envelope and its projection moved out of cmd/bd into
internal/eventsjournal, beside the activation and auto-prune logic that already
had to be reachable from two binaries; the spec pins EventRecord to that struct
with x-go-type, pinning.go proves the generator emitted an alias, and the
committed golden fixture now renders through the same function the handler
serves from. A second wire struct in internal/httpapi would have passed its own
tests while quietly shipping a different `ts` shape or a `dep` that appeared
when empty, and the consumer who notices is the one reconciling an HTTP mirror
against a CLI export.

THREE ANSWERS THE DATA CANNOT TELL APART, which is most of the design:

  - CAUGHT UP is a 200 with an empty list. "Nothing new yet" is an ordinary
    answer about a log, and a poller whose steady state was a 404 would have to
    treat this surface's miss vocabulary as its happy path.
  - DISABLED is a 409 `events_journal_disabled`. A journal that is off reads as
    zero rows and a head of zero — byte-identical to an enabled journal nothing
    has written yet — so without this gate a consumer would poll a workspace
    that will never emit a record and call itself caught up forever. Activation
    is workspace state, so it is resolved by cmd/bd (eventsjournal.EnabledFor)
    and handed in; this package resolves no workspace state of its own. A 409
    for CodeNotClosable's reason: a statement about state the client cannot see,
    which the same request stops earning once an operator changes it.
  - PRUNED PAST is a 410 `events_journal_truncated` carrying `since`, `floor`
    and `head`. It is the surface's only 410 and it is the right one: those
    records existed, were addressable by exactly this request, and were
    deliberately deleted — retrying the same `since` can never succeed, which is
    what a 404 would wrongly invite. The mapping lives in ClassifyError, keyed
    on the typed error with errors.As, so neither database source can forget it;
    the code is storage's own constant, so the CLI's `--json` failure and this
    body cannot drift to two spellings of one condition.

`head` is why the read seam grew. ReadEventsJournal answers what came next and
cannot answer "keep asking, or wait?", so ReadEventsPageInTx returns the rows
and the counter head from ONE transaction, read in that order — a head taken
first could land below the last row served, which a consumer reads as "past the
end" and stalls on. `bd events tail --follow` keeps the cheaper path: it runs
the truncation decision every second and pays for a head read only in the
ambiguous cases.

The handler holds storage.EventsJournalCursor, a read-only interface, not the
wider accessor the CLI takes. There is no prune, no acknowledge and no
truncate over HTTP: retention stays a workspace decision, and a surface
documented to publish the journal should not be one line from a delete.

EventsJournal is the first CONDITIONAL role on httpapi.Config — required
exactly when the workspace's journal is enabled. A storage backend with no
journal seam is an ordinary backend as long as nobody asked it to record
anything (eventsjournal.Apply takes the same deal at open time), and demanding
it unconditionally refused to start two registered-backend servers that had no
use for it.

`limit` runs 1..10000 defaulting to 1000, and `0` is REFUSED rather than
meaning unlimited as it does on the issue listings: a caller resuming from an
old checkpoint would otherwise ask one process to buffer the whole retained
window. `since` is required — defaulting a missing checkpoint to zero serves
the entire window to a consumer that meant to resume, which arrives as a flood
of duplicates rather than as an error.

Tests: handler-level over both refusals, the caught-up/empty/disabled trio, the
limit bounds and an int64 checkpoint; a storage-level head guard against the
real embedded store; and three end-to-end legs through a real `bd serve` —
mutate over HTTP then read the journal back gapless, prune and meet the 410 then
recover from floor-1, and a disabled workspace refusing. The truncation mapping,
the disabled gate, the window members and the limit ceiling were each mutated
and each failed a test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agent-Signature: claude-code-claude-opus-5[1m]-unknown-reasoning on behalf of julianknutsen
2026-08-09 06:01:23 +00:00
CI Bot
0a5fcad975 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into report/events-journal 2026-08-09 02:28:04 +00:00
CI Bot
5b3aa25dd5 feat(events): journal read/prune surface with typed truncation (bd-opisf)
The engine could write the journal but nothing could read it. This adds the
consumer-facing half: a store capability both plumbings implement, retention
floors, and a typed answer to the one question a sequential reader cannot
otherwise ask.

`WHERE seq > since` cannot distinguish "nothing new" from "your prefix was
pruned": both come back empty. A consumer resuming past a prune therefore
either stalls forever on an empty success or silently skips to the current
floor and drops every record in between, and neither leaves a trace. Reads now
fail with *storage.EventsJournalTruncatedError{Since, Floor, Head}, handing
back the window the engine can still serve so the caller decides explicitly:
resume from Floor-1 and accept the gap, or rebuild. The decision lives in one
place, ComputeEventsTruncation, so every plumbing answers a pruned-past
checkpoint identically. Seqs are gapless and prune only ever removes a prefix,
so the contiguous case is decided from the rows alone — `tail --follow` polls
once a second and must not pay for a counter read to be told it is healthy.
The counter is the head even when every row is gone, because prune never
touches it; that is what makes a fully-pruned journal distinguishable from a
caught-up one at all.

Pruning is a strict PREFIX delete: --before and both floors resolve to ONE
exclusive seq bound. That is a deliberate departure from the reference, which
expressed the age floor as a per-row `AND ts < cutoff` — and carries a latent
defect because of it. ts is CLIENT-stamped at insert and is NOT monotone in
seq: two writers against one SQL server, or one writer whose clock is stepped
back by NTP between commits, produce an OLDER timestamp at a HIGHER seq. The
per-row predicate then deletes that higher seq while keeping its lower-seq
neighbour, leaving a hole in the MIDDLE of the retained window — and the
truncation check can only see a missing prefix, so the hole is silent record
loss in the one feature whose whole promise is that a cursor can be trusted.
Resolving the age floor to a seq (MIN(seq) WHERE ts >= cutoff) costs one
scalar read and makes an interleaved timestamp keep more rather than split a
pair. Enterprise carries the per-row form and therefore the latent bug; flag it
at the next sync.

The read then checks the other half of the same property. Rows arrive in
memory already, so ComputeEventsTruncation sweeps the batch for an interior
seq gap and refuses on any hole regardless of cause — which covers what the
prefix argument cannot: a restored, hand-edited or partially-copied journal
table, and any future prune path that forgets the rule. It costs no query on
the healthy path.

The two checks are ordered: missing prefix first, interior sweep second. A
batch can have BOTH shapes at once and only one window can be reported;
naming the interior hole would hand back a Floor beyond a gap the caller was
never told about, stepping over it silently. Reporting the nearest hole means
a consumer that resumes from Floor-1 meets the next one on its next read, so
every gap is surfaced one resume at a time. An interior hole reports the last
seq servable from the caller's checkpoint as Since, so the value never moves
BACKWARD from what the caller presented and echoing it can never re-deliver
records a consumer already holds.

Both retention floors default ON (7 days / 100k rows). With both at 0 a single
`prune --before <large>` deletes the whole journal and strands the consumer it
was enabled for, with no local copy to recover from. Floors can only narrow the
bound; 0 still disables one explicitly. They are NOT a consumer watermark and
must not be sold as one — they protect a recent window, and a consumer further
behind than both allow can still be pruned past.

EventsJournalAccessor is the read/prune capability, implemented by BOTH direct
stores: the embedded store through its per-operation withConn (it owns its
connections and exposes no stable *sql.DB, so RawDBAccessor is not an option
there), the server-mode store through withReadTx/withRetryTx. The query bodies
stay at the issueops seam, so the two differ only in transaction machinery.

The unit-of-work plumbing gets the same reach through a repository and use case
rather than a raw connection — and, more importantly, it gets an activation
path it never had. Emission at the issueops seam is only half of coverage: the
plumbing must also turn journaling ON for the transaction the mutation runs in,
and doltSQLProvider had no way to. Left that way the second plumbing would have
shipped a journal that is permanently empty while every command succeeds and
every write lands, which is invisible from the outside. The provider now
implements storage.EventsJournalConfigurer and binds activation to the pinned
connection in BeginTx, after START TRANSACTION so the seq UPDATE and the SELECT
that must observe it stay on one session inside one transaction. The scope is
released wherever the connection is — releaseConn and poisonConn — so an
activation entry cannot outlive the transaction it describes and hand the next
borrower a journaling session.

Two vocabularies are frozen here rather than left implicit. The op set: six
wire ops plus engine-only `comment`, declared independently of the EventOp
constants so a new op that nobody classifies fails the test. And
EventComment.Source, which was an untyped string repeated at seven emit sites —
now CommentSourceStructured / CommentSourceAudit, which is what stops a
consumer-facing fixture from pinning a third value no emitter produces.
Consumers switch on these strings, so a rename is a breaking change even when
it compiles.

Also fixes a wire-contract gap the engine commit left: types.Issue gained
IsBlocked, which put is_blocked on the /v0 HTTP surface without a spec entry,
and the bijection guard fails on exactly that. The property is documented in
the five schemas pinned to the issue types; no generated output changes,
because those schemas are pinned to types.Issue rather than mirrored. Its
description says what is true rather than what would be tidy: no /v0 read
endpoint populates the field today, so its absence from a response says
nothing about whether an issue is blocked — it is the journal snapshots that
carry it, and they serialize the same type these schemas pin.

Ports 0a3fe0f9b (API-3.1 truncation + floors) and the accessor/domain shapes of
3bfed2431 onto current main. Deviations: the prune predicate above (an upstream
defect, fixed rather than replayed); and the reference activates the proxied
path by context (issueops.WithEventsJournal), which the engine commit
documented as test-only and in-transaction-only — provider-scoped activation is
the same guarantee bound to a real transaction.

Co-authored-by: CI Bot <ci@beads.test>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agent-Signature: claude-code-claude-opus-5[1m]-unknown-reasoning on behalf of julianknutsen
2026-08-09 01:58:17 +00:00
CI Bot
ea9ad2c5f4 fix(uow): fire script hooks on the unit-of-work plumbing (bd-opisf)
bd has two write plumbings and only one of them ran the workspace's hook
scripts. The DoltStorage decorator chain fires on_create/on_update/on_close
after every mutation it lands; the unit-of-work plumbing — the one
proxied-server mode writes through — fired nothing from the plumbing, so an
integration wired to .beads/hooks/ silently missed every mutation that went
through it. Four proxied commands had grown hand-wired RunSync calls of their
own to paper over the gap (update, close, reopen, gate); every other write —
create, batch create and close, claim, comment, label, dependency edits — ran
no hook at all.

NotifyingProvider closes the gap at the plumbing. Mutations are buffered as
they flow through the unit of work's use cases and the buffer drains to the
runner only after Commit succeeds: nothing fires mid-transaction, a rolled-back
or retried attempt fires nothing, and firing is fire-and-forget so a hook can
never fail a committed write. With no sinks the provider comes back unwrapped.
The per-command shims are gone — one firing site per plumbing — which drops the
two events proxied mode fired and the embedded path never did: the on_update
ahead of every close, and the on_close on a status-crossing update. It also
starts honoring `no-hooks`, which those shims ignored. CHANGELOG carries the
full list of what a proxied workspace sees change.

EVERY FIRING RULE IS MATCHED 1:1 against the decorator that implements it, and
each override cites its twin — including the ones that read backwards, like the
close that fires for an idempotent re-close because HookFiringStore.CloseIssueChecked
does. The payload matches too: a script is handed the issue with its LABELS, and
for an edge change its dependency records, because that is what the other
plumbing's re-read hands it. A create — and a whole graph apply, whose edges
are written beneath this seam entirely — reports every issue whose graph it
wrote: the created rows, whose on_create carries no records, and the far end of
any edge that leaves a row the plan did not create, each resolved across both
planes since an edge may name a wisp. Five deliberate divergences
remain and are listed in one place, the file header, with reasons.

Fire-and-forget is a promise about the MUTATION, not about the hook: a bd
command fires its hooks after the commit and returns, and the exit takes an
unstarted goroutine with it. hooks.Runner now tracks what it started and offers
a bounded Wait, called from two places because one is not enough — after the
store closes in PersistentPostRunE (an embedded workspace's Dolt lock has to be
released before a hook script's own bd can open it, and under -C the wait has to
precede the directory restore), and again in main() after ExecuteC, since cobra
skips PostRunE entirely when RunE returns an error. That second call is what
delivers the hook for the issue a partial batch DID commit. Both plumbings share
the runner, so both are covered.

The blocker on the first attempt was that it overrode a HAND-PICKED list of use
case methods, a coverage claim that decays the first time someone adds a verb.
notifying_parity_test.go replaces the claim with a PARTITION: reflection
enumerates every method of every surface the wrapper stands in front of, and
each is either recorded or carries a written reason for firing nothing — no
overlap, and no exemption for a method that no longer exists. Two AST guards
cover what reflection cannot, both scanning the whole package because a role
lives in its own file here: an accessor that delegates to the inner provider
(the edit that compiles, keeps every type assertion working and stops every
hook), and any code that reaches the unit of work beneath the recording layer.
There is exactly one of the latter — the import role, which runs the shared
batch-upsert engine on the raw statement runner and fires no hooks on either
plumbing. It now unwraps to reach it, where before it asserted the concrete type
and failed every import in a workspace that had hooks. The unwrap is unexported
so that guard stays complete.

`bd serve` still runs no hooks: it serves from uow.UnwrapProvider, and httpapi
refuses a hook-firing provider the way it already refuses a hook-firing role.

update_close_hook_test.go is retired. Its firing half observed
hooks.Runner.runHook, which internal/hooks tests directly (TestRunSync_Success,
TestRunSync_Timeout, TestRun_Async); its condition half asserted arithmetic on
local literals encoding the proxied-only predicate this change removes. The
contract it named — update fires on_update, close fires on_close, neither twice
— is pinned by TestNotifyingUOWOpToHookEventMapping and by the proxied
integration subtests.

Co-authored-by: CI Bot <ci@beads.test>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agent-Signature: claude-code-claude-opus-5[1m]-unknown-reasoning on behalf of julianknutsen
2026-08-08 07:49:57 +00:00
CI Bot
5778714f16 test(httpapi): gate the four request member lists the wave left ungated
The wave shipped six hand-rolled request member lists and gates for two
of them. claim, close and update each got a schema-vs-handler parity
test; reopenRequestMembers, addDependenciesMembers, dependencyEdgeMembers
and removeDependencyMembers — the four newest — got nothing, and a
tree-wide grep finds them referenced only by their own handlers.

That is precisely the drift class this file's own doc comment calls "the
one failure this file exists to prevent". These handlers decode raw
members rather than the generated struct so a refusal can name the
offending one, which is what makes additionalProperties: false
enforceable by a client that has stopped parsing prose — and the price is
a hand-rolled copy with nothing tying it to the document. Nothing else
closes the seam: the bijection test covers only x-go-type-pinned schemas,
make api-check ties the struct to the schema by codegen but ties neither
to the handler's list, and reopen_test.go and dependency_edit_test.go
never consult the spec.

There is no live bug — all four lists match today. This is the gate that
keeps them matching.

Proved red once, against the drift the gates exist for: a `note` member
added to ReopenIssueRequest, AddDependenciesRequest and
RemoveDependencyRequest in the spec, with make api-gen run so the
generated structs agree with it exactly. make api-check passes in that
state, every other test in the package passes, and only these three
subtests fail — in both directions each. That green-everywhere-else run
is the failure mode, reproduced.

edges[i] is gated at its own level, as IssuePatchBody is under the
update: a member the document grew there would be refused per edge with
an index attached, which reads like a data problem in one row rather than
like version skew.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 01:37:11 +00:00
CI Bot
5bd29359b3 docs(httpapi): stop the orientation prose enumerating a surface it no longer has
doc.go still opened with "the three reads ... and the one write, POST
/v0/beads/issues/{id}:claim" and stated that "the claim OPERATION is the
only mutation this surface has". bd-serve-v0.md still opened its surface
section with "Six operations" over a six-row table, sized the server
under "Claim throughput — the claim is the only mutation in v0", and
scoped the no-hooks and no-auto-commit contracts to the claim alone. The
route table serves twenty-seven operations, eleven of them writes. Both
pages name themselves sources of truth, and bd-serve-v0.md's own header
rule says nothing in it may contradict the spec, doc.go or the reader
role — so this was the rule violating itself.

The counts are not corrected, they are removed. routes.go is the router,
TestSpecRouteParity welds it to the spec by exact set equality in both
directions, and capabilities is derived from the same table: a fourth
copy of the list, spelled in prose, can only ever go stale — as this one
did, silently, across five merged PRs. Both pages now describe the
MECHANISM and point at it. What replaces the table in bd-serve-v0.md is
the surface's shape, which is what a design page is for and which does
not change when an operation is added: what answers from the process,
how reads reach roles, the two spellings a write comes in, and the
posture every write shares.

Statements that were true only of the claim are widened where the code
widened them (the JSON content type is enforced for every body-carrying
operation; hooks fire for no write; the idempotent-write commit skip is
the re-claim, the re-close and the reopen) and narrowed where they were
overstated (the reader property covers three named reads, not "all"
reads — the count, the query, stats, config, memories and the dependency
reads are on sibling roles). The design page's error table gains the
three codes the wave added, with the extension members each carries and
the absence that distinguishes the two dependency_cycle refusals.

Also sweeps the seven stale "one write on this surface" comments in
claim.go, claim_test.go, roles_test.go and update_test.go, and reads.go's
"the three read operations" header over a file that now holds five.

No wire change, no behavior change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 01:34:33 +00:00
CI Bot
86ae6bf266 test(httpapi): assert what the getIssue include legs actually carry
The two include parameters were pinned by presence alone: one comment
whose Text was checked, one dependent whose ID was checked, and nothing
about author, timestamp, edge type or order. That is far weaker than the
shape the document publishes. `Comment` requires author and created_at;
`IssueWithDependencyMetadata` requires dependency_type — and OpenAPI
`required` enforces key presence, never value correctness and never
array order, so a store answering comments newest-first or stamping one
edge type onto every dependent emitted schema-valid JSON and passed.

Both are CLI-observable. `bd show` prints each comment's author and time
in the order it received them, and groups dependents into their
depends-on/children/related/discovered sections by edge type, so a
flattened type renders every row into one section.

Both fixtures now carry two rows that differ on every member the schema
declares — comments at distinct whole seconds with distinct authors,
dependents on blocks and parent-child — and the new case asserts them
row by row, by index, because the index is the order promise: the
handler is a projection of the role's answer and may not sort, filter or
reshape it. The required-member sweep is read from the embedded document
rather than listed in the test, so a schema that grows a required member
the serve path cannot fill fails here instead of at a client.

Both halves were proved red before being made green: reversing the
seeded comments and stamping one edge type on every dependent fails nine
assertions, and adding a required member to the Comment schema fails the
derived sweep on every row.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 01:29:45 +00:00
CI Bot
4bf7b4baba feat(httpapi): publish addDependencies on the v0 surface
Completes the graph write side: a batch of edges asserted as ONE
transaction, or none of them, over issueops.DependencyEditor.

All-or-nothing is the role's shape rather than a policy choice here.
Edges asserted together describe a graph, and half a graph is a graph
nobody asked for — the cycle a caller was refused for is exactly the
state a partial commit would leave behind. That is batchCreateIssues'
posture (fix the payload, resend unchanged), not BatchCloser's
keep-the-survivors one, and it is proved where a fake role cannot prove
it: a batch whose later edge closes a cycle is read back through a real
`bd serve` against real Dolt and leaves zero edges.

Two frozen codes, both 409, both statements about state the client
cannot see without reading it — the claim's not_claimable situation, so
the claim's answer:

  dependency_cycle covers BOTH never-makes-progress refusals, the plain
  scheduling cycle and the blocking edge against the issue's own
  ancestor or descendant. One code because they have one client
  recovery and no force bypass, and codes are the vocabulary of
  recovery. The typed distinction is not lost: the hierarchy refusal
  additionally carries issue_id, blocker_id and blocker_is_ancestor,
  read from *DependencyHierarchyConflictError inside the refusing
  transaction, and member PRESENCE is the discriminator. The three are
  enough to rebuild the typed error whole, both polarities included,
  which is why the boolean travels through a pointer and is emitted
  when false. Nothing can recover them after the fact — the conflicting
  hierarchy may exist only inside the batch that was rolled back.

  dependency_exists is a pair carrying another type, with
  existing_type and requested_type from
  *DependencyTypeConflictError's fields.

The endpoint refusals PR #5415 typed are mapped to their 400 and named
by finding the refused edge in the request by BOTH endpoints, which is
what DependencyEndpointNotFoundError carries the whole edge for. A
target may legitimately be an `external:` reference or another
repository's id, so only a locally-visible absence refuses; the proxied
test pins both sides of that line.

A self-dependency is refused at the wire edge as a value, not a
conflict: it is invalid whatever the graph holds, and answering it here
is what lets the refusal name the offending edge.
SkipPerEdgeCycleCheck stays unpublished — an unauthenticated surface is
where a default must be the guarded one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 00:19:48 +00:00
CI Bot
63b74e26ca feat(httpapi): publish removeDependency on the v0 surface
The dependency graph has been read-only over HTTP: a client could list
edges, walk the tree and find cycles, but had to fork `bd dep remove` to
unwire one. This adds the first graph WRITE, a thin adapter over
issueops.DependencyEditor.remove.

POST /v0/beads/dependencies:remove is a collection-level custom method
rather than a DELETE. An edge is named by TWO endpoints, so there is no
single-segment resource path for a DELETE to mean, and a DELETE carrying
a body is the shape proxies mangle; the forgetMemory precedent cuts the
other way because that one names a single resource and carries no body.

The operation is idempotent and its code set has NO 404, deliberately.
An edge that is not there is `removed: false` inside a 200, and an
endpoint id that names nothing holds no edge either, so this operation
probes no id's existence and has nothing it could report a miss on. An
agent replaying its own teardown must not have to classify an error to
discover it already ran.

The role reaches the server the way every other one does: a required
Config field, an accessor built OVER the timing wrapper on the provider
path, and a serveIssueRoles binding off the peeled store. That peel is
load-bearing here — HookFiringStore.DependencyEditor recurses and fires
the workspace's update hook per edited source — so RoleFiresHooks learns
the type, and Listen refuses a hook-firing editor rather than trusting
the comment that says not to pass one.

TestServeIssueRolesComeFromBeneathTheHookDecorator grows the editor the
way it already carries the reader and the claimer: an identifiable value
per layer, a precondition that the decorator's own accessor answers
RoleFiresHooks true, and a post-peel assertion that the role is the
middle store's own. Without the precondition the peel assertion would
pass on a predicate that answers false for everything, which is what
holds the new RoleFiresHooks case in place — a comment cannot.

The actor decode was the third copy of the same eighteen lines, so it is
now one shared requiredActorMember and the claim and batch-create paths
call it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-08 00:19:48 +00:00
CI Bot
8b972724af feat(httpapi): serve updateIssue over v0
Adds PATCH /v0/beads/issues/{id}, the last operation in the write-lifecycle
tranche and the one with the widest body vocabulary.

A PLAIN METHOD, not a custom one, by the memories precedent: partial update of
one named resource is what PATCH already means, exactly as one named resource
with no body is what DELETE means for forgetMemory. It registers directly, keeps
pattern == specPath, and leaves the custom-method namespace for operations that
are not CRUD. The claim-route commentary calling the issue-detail path
"GET-only" is updated in the same change.

MEMBER PRESENCE IS THE SIGNAL, and that is why the body is decoded as raw
members: a member present sets the role's Field, a member absent leaves the
field untouched, and the generated struct cannot tell those apart because it
models both as a nil pointer. Explicit null is a third state read off the raw
bytes — a clear on the four nullable members, which are exactly the ones the
role models as Field[*T], and a 400 naming the member everywhere else. Without
that pre-check a `"title": null` would unmarshal to nil and slide through as
"untouched": a write the client asked for and the server silently dropped.

status, assignee and metadata are excluded and refused BY NAME. Keeping them
out is half the reason this operation documents no 409 at all — they are
exactly where close policy, the claim fence and the metadata algebra would have
entered its code set. parent_id, persistence, owner, closed_by_session, spec_id
and await_id are absent for the reasons the spec enumerates; each is additive
to publish later.

The role's ErrValidation maps to 400 in a failUpdate sibling of
failBatchCreate, with the same no-role-prose rule. Its ErrNotFound branch runs
first and is the divergence: this operation DOES address a resource by path, so
an id naming nothing is a genuine 404 rather than a statement about the body.

Two new spec gates. TestUpdateRequestMembersMatchTheHandler covers both levels
of the body, where a hand-rolled accepted set could otherwise drift from the
document with every other gate green. TestNullablePatchMembersAreExactlyThe
DocumentsNullableOnes pins the clear-vs-refuse set from both sides, because
drift there is silent in the worst direction: an unannounced clear on a field
nobody agreed could be cleared.

The PATCH wildcard also matches segments that look like custom methods, since
`{id}` matches any whole segment. That is the detail path's long-standing
behavior — GET has always answered the same way — and it resolves as an update
of an issue whose id is literally "bd-1:close", which no row holds.
TestPatchOnACustomMethodSegmentIsNeverTheCustomMethod pins the property that
matters: a PATCH never executes as a lifecycle verb.

Retained real-dependency proof: TestProxiedServerServeUpdate, against real
Dolt — one issue carrying a set member, a null-cleared member and an untouched
member, all read back after the PATCH; changed:false on a same-value resend;
label replacement removing an omitted label; and the workspace-vocabulary
refusal arriving as the documented 400 rather than a 500.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 22:25:47 +00:00
CI Bot
60dceab644 feat(httpapi): serve reopenIssue over v0
Adds POST /v0/beads/issues/{id}:reopen, the close's mirror. It completes the
lifecycle pair, so a recovery flow — close, discover the fix regressed, reopen,
reclaim — works end to end over this surface instead of dropping back to a
subprocess at the second step.

Near-trivial on the dispatcher the close built: a third row on the shared
wildcard is a row. That is the whole reason the delivery order puts it here.

No new codes, and the ABSENCE of a 409 is the operation's one design
statement. Close has a policy guard — open children, a live blocker — because
it moves an issue INTO the done category. Reopen moves it out, so there is no
state of the graph that can refuse it and nothing to name.
TestReopenPublishesNoConflictCode asserts that as an invariant rather than
leaving it as the current shape of a table, so a future guard has to land its
code deliberately.

`already_open` is `!result.Changed`, mirroring already_closed and
already_claimed: a reopen of a non-done issue changes nothing and succeeds,
because an agent replaying its own recovery should not have to classify an
error to learn it already ran.

The reason is recorded on the `reopened` EVENT rather than on a field of the
issue — the role's own contract — and the response deliberately does not carry
it, so a client reads it back from the place it actually lives.

The handler names the history entry (ReopenRequest.Provenance) instead of
taking the role's default. The implementations disagree about that default:
the store-backed ones write "bd: reopen issue" and the unit-of-work one
"reopen issue", so a workspace served by one backend today and another
tomorrow would grow two spellings of one event.

Retained real-dependency proof: TestProxiedServerServeClose grows the
close→reopen round trip against real Dolt — close_reason and
closed_by_session cleared, the reopen reason read back off the issue's event
stream via `bd history --events`, and the issue claimable again — plus the
idempotent reopen of an issue that was never done.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 22:25:42 +00:00
CI Bot
0a56867439 feat(httpapi): serve closeIssue over v0
Adds POST /v0/beads/issues/{id}:close, the half of the agent loop — claim,
work, close — that still forced an automation client back to forking a `bd`
subprocess.

The routing change is the substantive one. `{id}:close` is not expressible as
a ServeMux pattern for the same reason `{id}:claim` is not, and unlike the
claim it COLLIDES: two rows cannot each register POST
/v0/beads/issues/{idop}. The route table grows a `customMethod` field; rows
carrying one share a single registration behind a dispatcher that splits the
trailing suffix off the matched segment and hands the request to the row that
claims it. A segment ending in no registered suffix gets the same 404 the
catch-all gives any unrouted path, so the wide pattern stays a routing detail
rather than undocumented surface — and the split happens before s.route, so an
unrouted suffix takes no database slot and books no operation on the request
line.

TestSpecRouteParity is untouched in mechanism: each row still declares its own
specPath and the test still compares document paths.
TestClaimNarrowsThePOSTSurface generalizes to
TestCustomMethodsNarrowThePOSTSurface, which is where a dispatcher that fell
back to its first row would be caught — that failure would otherwise leave the
claim's happy path green.

`not_closable` (409) joins the frozen vocabulary with `open_children` as an
optional Problem extension member. Both close-policy refusals share the code;
the member is attached only for the open-children one, from
*CloseOpenChildrenError's own field inside the refusing transaction, so member
PRESENCE is the discriminator and no client parses "3 open child issue(s)" out
of prose. `already_closed` mirrors `already_claimed` for the idempotent
re-close, which under first-close-wins rewrites neither reason nor session.

The lifecycle role joins Config's store-shaped source, and RoleFiresHooks
learns about *hookIssueOperations: a store's own IssueLifecycle() returns a
role that fires on_create, on_update and the close hooks for every mutation it
lands, which is precisely the value this server documents it does not run.
Without that case bd serve would have booted with hooks live on four verbs.

Retained real-dependency proof: TestProxiedServerServeClose, against real
Dolt — first-close-wins read back through a second close (reason and session
unchanged), and a forced close over two real open children with the count
read back from the 409. The role-level transition is already owned by
internal/storage/uow/lifecycle_close_reopen_contract_test.go, which this
cites rather than duplicates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 22:25:38 +00:00
CI Bot
bc4406f821 feat(httpapi): add include_comments and include_dependents to getIssue
GET /v0/beads/issues/{id} documented comment bodies and dependents as
unreachable over v0: it took no query parameters, so `comments` and
`dependents` were always absent and a workflow that needed comment text
had to fork `bd show --json --include-comments`. The document named this
exact pair as the additive path out, and issueops.GetRequest has carried
the flags all along — this is the wire half.

Both parameters are optional and default false, decoded by the shared
query decoder, so a request that names neither builds the same
GetRequest the handler built before and the response is unchanged. The
defaults are the role's own: the two row lists are the expensive half of
this read, and a caller that wants only the cardinalities keeps paying
for neither.

invalid_argument joins getIssue's operationCodes row. A malformed
boolean is now this operation's OWN 400 — the getStats/skip_blocked
precedent — rather than the document-level unknown-key rule that table
omits. Adding a status+code pair to an operation is additive; clients
default-branch. Against an older server these parameters earn 400
unknown_parameter, which is the documented per-parameter capability
probe working as intended.

The handler keeps requireNoQuery's ordering by decoding the query before
bounding the id, so an unknown key on an id no row could hold stays the
400 that names what to fix instead of becoming a 404. IssueDetails'
`comments`, `dependents` and `comments_omitted` descriptions now name
the parameters that populate them; no schema changes, since the fields
were already specified.

Route table, path and capability (`issues.get`) are untouched:
capabilities gate operations, parameters are probed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 19:36:15 +00:00
CI Bot
9a74fccbb6 docs(httpapi): widen the actor pattern to the set the server refuses
validateActor refuses every Unicode Cc control character — C0, DEL and
the C1 block — plus U+2028/U+2029, on all four operations that take an
`actor`. The schema's pattern excluded only C0 and DEL, so the document
advertised a narrower rule than the server enforces; isControlChar has
carried a note since it was written that the pattern is the half that
should move at the next spec window.

Move it, on all four schemas at once. The four are one rule stated four
times — claim, sweep, delete and batchCreate share validateActor — so
widening one and leaving three would make the document disagree with
itself about a single validator. ClaimRequest.actor is the canonical
description and now spells the set out along with why C1 belongs in it:
U+0085 is a line break on a VT-conformant terminal, and U+009B is the
one-byte CSI introducer, so both reach the audit trail and the assignee
column that C0 is filtered out of.

A tightening of the published contract only. The server has always
refused these values, so no request that used to succeed now fails.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 19:25:12 +00:00
CI Bot
724025d7c6 docs(httpapi): document the JSON media-type requirement in the v0 spec
requireJSONContent refuses a body-carrying request whose Content-Type is
not application/json, with 400 invalid_argument / param: "Content-Type".
The frozen document mentioned Content-Type nowhere, so that was the one
400 on those routes a client generated from the schema could not predict
— a gap claim.go had already flagged as prose owed at the next revision
window.

State it once at the document level, beside the Host-header and
unknown-query-parameter rules, because it holds for every body-carrying
operation rather than for any one of them. The rule carries its own
argument: a JSON content type is not CORS-simple, so the refusal is what
makes a cross-origin write trigger a preflight this server never
approves. 415 stays unused — it is not in this surface's status
vocabulary, and minting one here would be permanent wire surface.

Prose only. The server already enforces this on every route that takes a
body, and no status, code, param or reason changes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 19:24:28 +00:00
Steve Yegge
01f9166810
fix(defer): auto-wake expired dated defers on ready-front reads and claims (bd-i8qx8) (#5386)
* fix(defer): auto-wake expired dated defers on ready-front reads and claims (bd-i8qx8)

A dated defer (bd defer --until / bd update --defer) sets status=deferred
plus defer_until, but nothing ever flipped the status back — the ready
WHERE clause's defer_until predicate only helps rows already 'open', so an
expired defer stayed invisible to bd ready forever until a human ran bd
undefer. One deployment measured 241 issues (24 P1s in the first census)
silently dark this way, regenerating ~11/day from correct-looking
automation ('needs-design cooldown' call sites that defer +7d).

Fix: a lazy wake sweep (issueops.WakeExpiredDefersInTx, one shared DBTX
body serving both storage stacks, shaped after ReclaimExpiredLeasesInTx)
runs at the top of every ready-front read and claim:

- classic dolt server store: GetReadyWork/WithCounts/CountReadyWork and
  readyClaimer.ClaimNext, via runIssueOperationTxWithMessage in a write tx
  of its own (the read paths' withReadTx always rolls back)
- embedded store: same three seams plus its readyClaimer
- domain/uow stack (proxied CLI + bd serve): uow.WakeExpiredDefers in a
  committing UOW before Reader.Ready, Reader.List(--ready), the proxied
  CLI ready route, and uow readyClaimer.ClaimNext

Waking writes status=open, defer_until=NULL — byte-identical to bd
undefer, so a later dateless re-defer cannot inherit a stale past date —
and records a status_changed event (actor bd-defer-wake). A DATELESS
defer never auto-wakes: it is the indefinite icebox, and bd undefer stays
its only exit. The sweep is RowsAffected-gated (zero matches ⇒ no dolt
commit), advisory by contract (a ready listing never fails because the
sweep could not run; strict --readonly skips it), and covers wisps
(dolt_ignored, so wisp wakes mint no version commit by construction).

Tests: TestEmbeddedDeferAutoWake (wake/icebox/future/claimable) and
TestProxiedServerDeferAutoWake (parity subtest), green alongside the
existing defer/undefer/ready embedded and proxied suites.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: auto-regenerate CLI reference

Applied from the cli-docs-freshness-patch artifact of https://github.com/gastownhall/beads/actions/runs/31145176188
(generated with CI's canonical pinned build). See
scripts/check-cli-docs-drift.sh for how drift is attributed.

* fix(defer): persist wisp-only wakes in the uow stack; warn-once on access-denied (bd-i8qx8)

The uow sweep discarded wisp-only wakes: the repo returned only the
permanent-issue count, a wisp-only sweep produced commitMsg == "",
RunTxResult skipped Commit, and Close rolled the transaction back —
expired wisp defers stayed deferred forever in proxied/serve mode while
embedded mode woke them, and every ready read redid and re-discarded the
same writes. A wake commit message would not have fixed it: wisp tables
are dolt_ignored, so DOLT_COMMIT errors nothing-to-commit and the tx
still rolls back.

WakeExpiredDefers now reports (issues, wisps) through the repo and use
case; the uow sweep commits with the wake message when permanent issues
woke, and persists a wisp-only wake via uw.Commit(ctx, "") — the
ephemeral plain-COMMIT form RunTxEphemeral keeps for dolt_ignored state.
Wisp parity subtests added to both the embedded and proxied defer
auto-wake tests.

Also: dberrors.IsAccessDenied classifier + warn-once handling in both
defer-wake advisory handlers, so a read-only-privileged client gets one
warning per process instead of one per bd ready.

* ci: trigger runs for 0a94d44f4 (empty)

* test(defer): teach the ready-surface test fixtures about the wake sweep (bd-i8qx8)

Three fixtures pinned the pre-sweep ready path and broke against it:

- readerIssues and recordingIssues embed a nil domain.IssueUseCase and
  stub only the read methods, so the sweep's promoted WakeExpiredDefers
  call segfaulted (surfacing as a 500 on every httpapi ready-surface
  test). Both now stub a no-op sweep.
- The reader-parity fixture's provider pool held one unit of work; the
  ready arm now opens two (sweep, then read span), and past the pool the
  mock provider hands out zero-valued units. The pool holds both.
- TestAReadRouteTimesTheUnitsOfWorkItsReaderOpens counted exactly one
  unit of work; the count is now two, and both still land in uow_ms,
  which is the property the test exists to pin.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-07 04:34:38 -07:00
Julian Knutsen
4e8b017fd4
Put the memory plane behind memoryops, conformance-tested at three backends (#5387)
The memory commands get the treatment the sixteen issue commands got in #5378:
a role interface in a leaf package, conformance-tested at all three backends,
with the CLI routes and the HTTP handlers as thin callers over one
implementation.

memoryops is its own namespace rather than an addition to issueops. The two
planes share a config table and nothing else; a memory whose key shadows a
settings name is still a memory, and that separation is now the role's,
pinned by its contract, rather than a filter each caller reapplies.

Closes an unauthenticated disclosure found on the way: memory content was
served in cleartext on GET /v0/beads/config, and reachable through two more
doors — `bd config show` and `bd info --json`, the latter republished into
agent transcripts by MCP get_schema_info. Enumeration is now filtered at the
shared seam (workapi.FilterSettingsEnumeration); `bd config show` is left
alone deliberately, since an operator asks for it by name.

Two wire contracts were settled after the review council, recorded in full on
the PR: the search parameter is spelled `search` rather than `q`, because
issues:query already publishes `q` as a boolean expression and one surface
must not spell two questions one name; and getMemory keeps its 404, because
the status reports the distinction the front door already reports and
`bd recall` exits 1 on a miss where `bd config get` exits 0.
2026-08-07 03:57:04 -07:00
CI Bot
76e3b16fd7 Merge branch 'facade/wave-3' into facade/wave-4
# Conflicts:
#	.golangci.yml
#	cmd/bd/dep.go
#	internal/httpapi/stats.go
2026-08-06 21:39:05 +00:00
CI Bot
06a84ca81b Merge branch 'facade/wave-2' into facade/wave-3 2026-08-06 21:18:34 +00:00
CI Bot
ed82acd5d4 Wave 2 review fixes: dep list shape, stats 400, and the blocked-count promise
THE dep list SHAPE (M3). The direct route chose the edge-records path on
len(resolved) — counted AFTER unresolvable anchors are warned-and-skipped —
while batch membership and the proxied route both key on the argument count.
So `bd dep list <good> <typo> --json` printed RelatedIssue objects on this
route and the documented flat array of dependency records on the other. This
is the third fall-through readDepListEdges' own comment claimed was gone; the
comment now counts to three and the gate reads batchMode.

STATS 400 (M4). The empty-assignee guard compared the RAW string, so
`?assignee=%20` slipped past it into the role, came back ErrValidation, hit
ClassifyError — which has no row for that sentinel — and left as a 500 with an
operator alert attached, for a trailing space in somebody's script. Empty now
means trimmed-empty, which is what the role means by it, and failStatsErr draws
the ErrValidation-is-a-400 line the delete, tree, edges, blocking and
batch-create handlers each draw locally. Four spellings pinned.

THE BLOCKED-COUNT PROMISE (M5). statsreporter.go said BlockedIssues excludes
"closed and pinned ones" one bullet after teaching that PinnedIssues counts the
pinned FLAG. All three implementations exclude by STATUS, so a flag-pinned open
row with a blocker IS counted — the opposite of the doc's natural reading. The
doc now says status, and says the two readings land on different rows.

The exclusion clause had no case on any backend: no closed-and-blocked row, no
status-pinned one, no flag-pinned one. Green on three legs over a quadrant
where a fourth backend written to the doc would have disagreed with all of
them. RunStatsReporterBlockedExcludesByStatusNotByThePinnedFlag seeds all
three shapes and asserts the one that counts.
2026-08-06 21:18:26 +00:00
CI Bot
73f8ba1d8a Merge branch 'facade/wave-2' into facade/wave-3
# Conflicts:
#	.golangci.yml
#	cmd/bd/serve.go
#	cmd/bd/serve_test.go
2026-08-06 12:46:43 +00:00
CI Bot
4787722b78 Merge branch 'facade/wave-1' into facade/wave-2
# Conflicts:
#	.golangci.yml
#	CHANGELOG.md
#	cmd/bd/serve.go
#	cmd/bd/serve_test.go
2026-08-06 12:43:04 +00:00
CI Bot
67d38d2620 Trim this series' comments toward the repo's own density
Ten agents over 216 files, one directory-balanced group each, working to a
rubric that named what to cut (duplication narration, restatement of the next
line, the governing rule echoed in every command file, throat-clearing) and
what to keep (traps, invariants, security, tracker ids, behaviour changes, and
the "why a naive simplification destroys this assertion" rationale).

Net 1,523 lines. Density against this repo's own per-directory norm on main:

  cmd/bd              33.6% -> 27.3%   (main 10.7%)
  internal/storage    26.1% -> 23.1%   (main 14.1%)
  backend/conformance 34.0% -> 29.6%   (main 22.8%)
  internal/httpapi    30.9% -> 27.8%   (main 30.6%, now below)
  overall             34.7% -> 31.6%

Every agent landed at 18-25% rather than the 30% asked for, and every one gave
the same reason independently: what remained was on the keep list. Ten separate
judgements agreeing is the most useful result here — the prose is dense, but it
is mostly load-bearing, and the shortfall is the honest answer rather than a
failure to try.

TWO REVERTS, both to protect something worth more than the lines.

issueops/ is back to its pre-trim state, giving up 610 lines. The conformance
contracts cite the leaf docs BY LINE — "pins treewalker.go:52-66" — 155 times.
Trimming the cited files silently repointed those at whatever text moved into
those numbers, across agent boundaries so no agent could see it. A semantic
remapper recovered 141 of them, but 23 needed judgement and several landed on
struct fields. The leaf docs are the spec the contracts are written against;
they are the one place in this change where dense prose IS the deliverable, and
keeping them stable is worth more than the 610 lines. tree_walker_contract.go
and version_reconciler_contract.go went back for the same reason: an agent had
deleted a paragraph containing a citation, so positional restoration could not
align them.

After the reverts, exactly 5 citations point into a still-trimmed file and 2 of
those are weak — both in cmd/bd/config_guard_test.go, which this series never
touched and whose citations were already wrong on main (init.go:361 pointed at
a closing brace; the guard it names is at init.go:1499).

VERIFICATION. A guard strips every comment and all whitespace from each of the
193 modified files at HEAD and in the worktree and requires the two to be
byte-identical, so a code change cannot hide in a comment diff. It handles `//`
inside string and raw-string literals, and was tested against a deliberate code
change before being trusted. gofmt clean, go build, go vet, golangci-lint 0
issues, and the two AST-based tests that PARSE trimmed files — the timed
provider binding pin over claim.go and the serve database-source gate over
serve.go — both pass.

One real defect found while trimming: checkDatabaseSource's doc block ran into
`// sourceRoles is ...` with no blank line, so godoc attached thirty-one lines
of the wrong prose to func sourceRoles and left checkDatabaseSource
undocumented. Fixed by separating them.
2026-08-06 08:06:59 +00:00
CI Bot
bd6d6b1612 Close the three coverage gaps the council found
TreeWalker: RootID's EXACT promise had no case, and cross-plane coverage was
one quadrant of four.

The absent-root case probes a ghost id with no near-real sibling, so it is
satisfied by exact, prefix, fuzzy and collation-loose resolution alike.
ResolvesTheRootIDExactly probes the four near misses the leaf names, following
the Relations contract's precedent — a loose root on this role is a wrong
GRAPH, not a wrong row.

CrossesPlanesFromAWispRootAndUpward adds a wisp AS THE ROOT and an UP walk
crossing a plane. The existing case seeds durable -> wisp -> durable and walks
down. A root probe reading only the issues table fails the first; an
up-adjacency reading only `dependencies` rather than the union fails the second
and passes everything else here, because the up case was durable-only. All
three legs share one walk body, so nothing else would catch either.

Deleter: the fourth quadrant of the both-planes-both-ends guard — a wisp as the
DEPENDENT, edge in wisp_dependencies, durable row named unforced. Three
quadrants had cases; this one had none, and the two bodies scan different
tables to answer it.

All three cases pass on all three legs today. They pin behavior that was
already correct, which is the point: the suite could not previously tell.

internal/httpapi: TestEveryTimedProviderAccessorBindsToTheWrapper.

timedProvider is the one type here where a CONSTRUCTOR beats an accessor — the
role must bind to the timing wrapper or the units of work it opens land outside
the request's uow_ms. Every accessor documents that hazard; only two of the
thirteen could fail on it, both per-route. Constructing Sweeper and BatchCreator
over p.inner as an experiment left the entire package green.

The pin reads the binding off the AST, which covers all thirteen at once
including the three write roles whose transactions are the longest this server
runs. A per-route pin for each would need a delayed provider fake and a valid
request per operation; this is not a replacement for the two that exist, and
says nothing about what the roles do.
2026-08-06 06:53:27 +00:00
CI Bot
489e0d1892 Correct the prose the council found false, including one this series introduced
Eleven minor findings from the review council, all of the same family: a
statement that was true when written and was not updated when the thing it
counted grew. Fixing the ones that are wrong TODAY; the coverage gaps the same
lenses found are filed rather than fixed here.

THE ONE THIS SERIES CAUSED. The ghost-cleanup commit (8baf16989) collapsed a
"drives all six" / "drives all five" ghost pair in roles_test.go into "drives
every database-touching operation" — reaching for a sentence the next role
would not invalidate, and landing on one that was false immediately. The test
drives ten of the sixteen capability-bearing operations in routes.go; the other
six are covered in their own files. The doc now says which ten, where the rest
live, and why the sentence must not be generalized a third time. That is the
better lesson than the fix: a future-proof phrasing bought at the cost of a
present-tense falsehood is a worse trade than the stale count it replaced.

THE PUBLISHED DOCUMENT CONTRADICTED ITSELF. openapi.v0.yaml called sweep "the
only DESTRUCTIVE operation on this surface" eighty-five lines above calling
delete "the second DESTRUCTIVE operation". Both now name the pair. The pinned-
schemas header carried a merge ghost — "Each of the eight below" immediately
followed by "Each of the ten below" — where the real count is twelve, as the
paragraph nine lines further down already said. Same claim in problem.go and
sweep.go.

sweep.go also said ErrValidation is a 400 "HERE and nowhere else yet". Five
more handlers draw that line now (delete, tree, edges, blocking, batch-create),
each deliberately in the same shape. The comment says so, and keeps the reason
ClassifyError is still not the place for it.

claim.go said IssueReader and IssueClaimer "are the two places where a
constructor is the right call". timedProvider now has thirteen, every one of
them correct — this is the single type in the codebase where a constructor
beats an accessor, because the whole point is to bind the role to the TIMING
wrapper rather than to the provider inside it. A reader who took the sentence
literally would conclude the other eleven are violations and "fix" them into
uow_ms=0.000 for every write route. StatsReporter also introduced itself as
"the third time" while being the fourth.

execution.go justified CreateRequest having no Provenance field with "no
surface has ever named the created issue in its commit message". That is false
— internal/storage/dolt/issues.go writes "bd: create <id>" and is reached from
cmd/bd/create_atomic.go — and it is the premise wave 1 reasoned from when it
let the proxied route's message change to "create issue". The comment now says
what is actually true: the field does not exist, so there is no label to
prefer, and that is a gap with two possible closures rather than a principle.

CHANGELOG: the programme-close entry said "sixteen operations, ten of them
added by the programme" — main carries four, so it added twelve. The wave-2
entry said "adds five" above a list of six, which its own arithmetic (6 + 6 =
twelve) already contradicted. And the sweep endpoint's entry documented two of
its three safety properties, omitting protect_referenced — the one that needed
owner adjudication, and the only place the HTTP default deliberately disagrees
with the CLI flag it mirrors. It says so now, including how to opt out.
2026-08-06 06:22:56 +00:00
CI Bot
50a780647f Follow the relocated large-fixture budget in the testing.Short allowlist
CI's PR policy failed on scripts/check-testing-short.sh. The check is an
allowlist keyed on file::function, and the sweeper slice (519fb1479) deleted
cmd/bd/prune_bench_test.go, moving that budget into internal/workapi as
TestCandidateIDMatcherLargeFixture — the same skip, in the package the matcher
moved to, renamed for what it now measures. The allowlist entry became stale in
the same commit that created its replacement.

This is a RENAME of the existing exception, not a new one: the old entry is
removed, so the count of approved testing.Short() sites is unchanged and a
genuinely new skip still has to be argued for.

Also two stale counts, both the same accumulation this series has been prone
to — a wave adds a role and updates the prose in one place but not the other:

  - cmd/bd/serve.go said "the two issue roles" in two places, above a struct
    that now carries thirteen.
  - internal/httpapi/roles_test.go had THREE separate cases each introducing
    itself as "the newest role" (querier, sweeper, ready counter). At most one
    can be, and none of them is after wave 4. The general point those comments
    were each restating — that the case which matters is the newest role
    missing, because that is what a caller written against the previous release
    passes — is stated once on the test's doc comment now, so each row keeps
    only what is specific to it.
2026-08-06 05:52:52 +00:00
CI Bot
8baf16989d Delete the comment ghosts this series left in internal/httpapi
Waves 2, 3 and 4 each widened the roles-backed database source, and each one
rewrote the same paragraphs to say "and also this new role" — without deleting
the sentence it was replacing. Six blocks accumulated two or three overlapping
variants, and some of the leftovers were sentence FRAGMENTS with no subject:

	// a nil dereference inside a handler, and a pair without a ready counter
	// would do the same on the one read that is not the reader's.

Others were actively wrong by the time the next wave landed — Config's field
doc still opened "Reader, Claimer, Settings and Stats are the roles" above
thirteen fields, checkDatabaseSource carried three versions of one paragraph,
and a test doc said "drives all six" directly above "drives all five".

Each block now keeps one statement, phrased so the next role does not require
rewriting it: "the fields below", "every database-touching operation", "one
issueops role each". The worked example in Config no longer enumerates
accessors it would fall behind on; it names cmd/bd's serveIssueRoles, which is
that loop written out and is compile-checked against the real set.

No behavior change; comments and one test doc only.

Found by scanning this series' whole diff for near-duplicate lines inside a
single comment block, which is what the accumulation looks like mechanically.
The other seven hits that scan produced were false positives — CHANGELOG lines
that differ only in an issue number, and code samples inside comments.
2026-08-06 05:43:43 +00:00
CI Bot
59a1df98b5 Merge origin/main into the facade wave 1-4 series
Five files collided. Four were textual; the fifth was a semantic collision
that no textual resolution would have caught, and it is the reason this is a
merge rather than a rebase — resolving it once beats resolving it 25 times.

THE SEMANTIC ONE. main grew a second bd serve arm (serveSourceStore) that
serves a registered backend from the store the root command already opened,
wiring httpapi.Config from two role accessors. This series grew that same
Config from two roles to thirteen and made Listen refuse a PARTIAL set. Both
sides are individually correct and merge cleanly as text; together they bind
nothing — every registered-backend serve fails at startup with "no database
source". Caught by main's own two serve tests, which is what those tests are
for.

serveIssueRoles now returns the whole set as a struct rather than a growing
list of unnamed results, so a role added to Config without being added here
is a compile error at the call site instead of a startup failure. It stays a
struct rather than an httpapi.Config because the gate test in serve_test.go
requires every httpapi.Config literal in cmd/bd to sit in a function that
consulted serveDatabaseSource, and the extraction has not.

Two test doubles needed the new accessors. serveRolesStore returns nil for
the eleven it does not exercise, which is honest: it never reaches Listen,
and reader and claimer are enough to pin the peel DEPTH that test is about,
since serveIssueRoles peels once and calls every accessor on that one value.
serveIdentityStore does reach Listen, so its roles must be non-nil; they
embed their interfaces rather than implementing them, keeping that file's
stated preference for a nil-panic naming the method over a stub that
answered.

THE TEXTUAL FOUR.

.golangci.yml — both sides edited the same forbidigo path lists. Resolved as
set arithmetic against the merge base rather than by picking a side, then
verified programmatically: every addition from either side survives and every
removal from either side survives.

CHANGELOG.md — unioned.

create_proxied_server.go — rerere replayed a prior resolution; verified by
reading that it carries both main's refusal text and this series' CreateOnly
lifecycle flag rather than one at the cost of the other.

serve.go and serve_test.go — took main's substantive rewrites, re-applying
this series' corrections on top: the extended unauthenticated-surface warning
now names bulk delete, and the roles paragraph says "every role accessor"
rather than "both".

serve_test.go's AST gate keys off Reader+Claimer as the roles-source signal.
That is sound for the question it asks — which database source did this
Config name — but the pair is now hand-maintained against a thirteen-role
struct, so it carries a note pointing at bd-lidlu.
2026-08-06 05:40:12 +00:00