* feat(http): serve list/show counts/dep tree/ping, close+reopen under a session, one-lookup not-found (S6b/S6c/S6d) S6c. The external-dependency decorator rebuilt its role views from the legacy DoltStorage seam (storereader over itself, IsBlocked, GetDependencyTree, ClaimReadyIssue), which a remote store only partly serves: `bd list`/`bd children` refused on the SearchIssuesWithCounts stub, `bd show --json` printed zero counts, the default `bd dep tree` refused, `bd ready --claim` and `bd close` of an externally blocked issue reached unsupported paths. For a storage.RemoteBackendStore each view now passes the inner role through and lays the policy over it in role terms (externaldeps/remote_roles.go): ready reads and the ready claim exclude the workspace-wide blocked set over a widened window; per-issue checks (claim, close, batch close, list annotations, tree leaves) read only the named issues' edges through EdgeReader instead of every edge in the workspace. A server advertising policy.external_dependencies (MC's does) gets a plain passthrough. `bd ping` uses a new storage.Pinger, which the http store answers with its authenticated context read. S6d. A store reporting storage.CallerAttributionLimitedStore (http) cannot carry a Provenance label or a patch's closed_by_session. The library still refuses both; the CLI omits them where nothing is lost: `bd reopen`'s fixed "bd: reopen <id>" label (the server labels the same entry), and the closed_by_session of `bd update -s closed` (attribution only, usually the ambient CLAUDE_SESSION_ID; an explicit --session prints a notice; `bd close` still records it). See cmd/bd/remote_backend.go. S6b. utils.ExactIDLookupStore: the resolver stops at exact lookups for a store with no substring search, so a missing prefixed id is a not-found (beadserrors.ErrNotFound, "no issue found matching") after one getIssue. The general resolver no longer repeats an identical normalized probe. The http SearchIssueIDs answers D11's partial-id refusal, which now unwraps to ErrNotFound. Contributor auto-routing for a remote workspace reads local config only, so the not-found fallback pays no settings round trip. `bd update <absent> --claim` (gc's hook claim) answers a gc-classifiable not-found in at most two requests. Served e2e (backend/http/e2e_remote_roles_test.go): every gc list shape and `bd children` against embedded, `show --json` count parity, default dep tree parity, external blocking still enforced, close/reopen under CLAUDE_SESSION_ID, missing-id request counts, absent-id claim against the current server and the MC handshake mask, policy passthrough under the MC mask, ping. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(externaldeps): role-level remote reader and claimer cases bd ready and bd update --claim reach the policy through the legacy seam and the lifecycle guard, so the remote Reader.Ready exclusion and the remote Claimer guard (what bd serve and library callers reach) are pinned at the role level with a fake remote store. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(http): bd serve advertises policy.external_dependencies; clients pass through bd serve composes every ready, claim, claim-next, close, blocking and tree role through the external-dependency policy, but never said so. Every client therefore ran the policy a second time, with the CLIENT machine's external-project config, and claim-next became a non-atomic read-then-claim loop on the client. The server now advertises the token exactly when the roles it serves were composed through the policy: httpapi.Config.ExternalDependencyPolicy, which bd serve derives from its actual chain (externaldeps.Applied for the store arm, externaldeps.AppliedToProvider for the provider arm). A server handed raw roles still withholds it, so the token stays truthful. Against a server that advertises it, every remote role view hands the request to the server's own role untouched: no client validation, no edge reads, claim-next is the server's one atomic call, and the ready count is the server's countReadyWork (new remoteReadyCounter). The client-side policy remains only for servers that do not advertise the token. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(create): default created_by to the request's actor in the create role created_by was stamped in two front doors and never in the library: the CLI (creationActorStamp, with a remote-workspace special case) and the three httpapi create handlers. A library caller of Lifecycle.Create or BatchCreator with an empty CreatedBy stored "" locally and the actor over http. PreparePublicCreateRequest, which every create shape prepares through (Lifecycle.Create, BatchCreator items, batch-apply create items), now defaults an empty CreatedBy to request.Actor; an explicit value is kept. The handlers no longer stamp, `bd create` and the state event create pass only the actor, and creationActorStamp/isRemoteBackendWorkspace are gone. The CLI sites that still create through the raw CreateIssue seam (swarm, todo, gate, the create form) keep stamping currentActor(): that seam is shared with import, where defaulting would re-attribute imported rows, and the http store refuses it anyway, so the remote special case was never reachable there. Conformance: the lifecycle-create, batch-creator and batch-apply contracts now pin created_by == actor for an item that names none, on every leg. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(httpclient): GetIssue answers a miss with storage.ErrNotFound, like the local stores The http store's raw GetIssue answered a missing id with (nil, nil), where DoltStore and the embedded store return a wrapped storage.ErrNotFound. A caller written against the backend contract read the http miss as a hit: `bd create --graph` refused every explicit-id plan over http (patched in cmd/bd on feat/http-mc-corpus; that workaround is reverted there). GetIssue now returns the miss (and the empty id) as storage.ErrNotFound, spelled as issueops.GetIssueInTx spells it. GetLabels, which reads through GetIssue, keeps the local read's "no labels" answer for a missing id; the `bd list --parent` walk reads the typed miss as "parent issue not found". The served bridge test now holds the local reference store and the http store to the same miss: ErrNotFound with the same text. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(createbatchequiv): re-record the apply golden for the created_by default c2866ea7fe made the create role default an empty CreatedBy to the request's actor, so every create item of the apply scenario's batch (actor "apply-writer") now stores created_by "apply-writer" instead of "". TestCreateBatchFastPathsMatchPerRow_*/apply compared the stored rows to a digest recorded before that change and failed on exactly the three tables the column reaches: issues and wisps (the row) and events (the update event's old-value snapshot). Fast and per-row bodies still agree; the batch-apply conformance contract pins the same value. Bisected with bazel: passes at be92efe40f's integ twin 696f7acc8e, fails from the created_by commit on. Only apply.json's three digests move. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: gofmt ledger.go and the externaldeps remote-roles test Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cmd/bd): bd create reads routing settings local-only on a remote backend too determineAutoRoutedRepoPath skipped a remote backend's settings document (routing targets are local paths that one shared document cannot name for every client), but getRoutingConfigValue, which `bd create` and migrate-personal read routing.* and contributor.* through, still asked it. The same workspace could route a create one way and a lookup another, and every create paid a settings round trip per key. Both now go through routingSettingsStore: nil for a remote backend, so routing comes from config.yaml / the environment only there, and a local store is still consulted. A unit test holds both reads to the rule with a store that counts settings reads. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(cmd/bd): say so when update -s closed drops an ambient CLAUDE_SESSION_ID Over http `bd update -s closed` cannot carry closed_by_session, so the CLI drops it rather than refusing the close. An explicit --session printed a notice; the ambient CLAUDE_SESSION_ID every agent under Claude Code exports was dropped without a word, a silent data difference from a local backend (the served corpus's mc-update-meta-status-closed). The drop is now named on stderr in both cases, once per command, pointing at `bd close`, whose wire operation records the session. The served e2e asserts the notice. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(backend/http): hold bd list --limit 2 to each side's own unlimited order TestE2E_ListWithGCFiltersMatchesEmbedded compared the --limit 2 rows of the served and embedded workspaces as sets. The seed has four P2 rows, so the limit cuts a priority tie whose created_at order differs between two workspaces seeded seconds apart: a test-only flake, the order itself being total. Each side's two rows must now be, in order, the first two of that same side's --limit 0 listing; the unlimited listings are still compared across sides by the shape loop. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: unit-tier pins for the created_by default, the policy token and the GetIssue miss Three review mutations were caught only by a heavier tier (the uow conformance legs, the served httpclient tier) or by one package's test alone. Each now has a unit test where its rule lives: - issueops: PreparePublicCreateRequest defaults an empty CreatedBy to the actor and keeps an explicit one, without mutating the caller's request. - externaldeps: the policy layer AppliedToProvider finds becomes the handshake's policy.external_dependencies through httpapi.Listen, the composition bd serve performs, and a raw provider's handshake lacks it. - httpclient (no embedded engine): GetIssue over the real wire client against a stub server answers a 404 not_found, and the empty id without dialing, as storage.ErrNotFound spelled like the local stores. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(changelog): S6b/c/d entries match the code The S6 entry still said `bd create` suppresses created_by on a remote workspace and that the external-dependency policy runs client-side. Since S6b/c/d, created_by defaults to the actor in the library on every backend, and every bd serve composed through the policy advertises policy.external_dependencies, so clients pass those operations through; the client-side policy (now in role terms) runs only against a server that does not advertise it. New entries: the advertised policy token, bd ping over http, the created_by library default, closed_by_session dropped by an http `bd update -s closed` (with a notice, typed or ambient), reopen without a Provenance label over http, local-only routing.* / contributor.* on a remote backend, GetIssue's miss as storage.ErrNotFound, and list/children/show counts/dep tree over http. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(externaldeps): keep S6's list --ready, --claim-next refusal and lost-race error on the S6c composition The re-adopted S6 head (#7288) carries the review fixup's remote role composition; S6c replaces it with its own (rolesAreRemote, the widened ready window, the policy passthrough). Two behaviours S6 shipped and its reviews pinned would otherwise go: - bd close --claim-next against a server that does not apply the policy is refused whole, before anything is read or closed, with "the served batch close cannot carry a next claim, so nothing was closed; close without --claim-next, then run `bd ready --claim`". S6c passed the batch to the http closer, whose W-CloseBatchRequest.ClaimNext refusal drops the remedy, so TestE2E_BDOverHTTP's two refuseClaimNext steps went red. A request invalid on every backend is still ErrValidation first, and a server that applies the policy still gets the request untouched. - remoteReadyClaimer.ClaimNext reports a page on which every candidate was lost to another actor as "claim ready: lost N races ...", not as the empty answer that means there is no work. - `bd list --ready` (List with ReadyFlag) is answered by the policy store's own reader over the served ready reads, as S6 does. S6c passed it to the served listing, which cannot carry ReadyFlag (httpclient ledger row E-ListRequest.ReadyFlag), so it exited 1 over http with or without external refs; TestE2E_BDOverHTTP and TestServedRolesKeepTheExternalDependencyPolicy were red on it. TestRemoteReaderAnswersAReadyListingWithoutTheWireFlag pins it, with the fake's served List refusing ReadyFlag as the wire does. S6's composition tests now run against S6c as remote_roles_composition_test.go. Their fake serves Ready the way a server does (the S6 composition read ready work through the legacy policy reader instead), and two call logs gain that Ready. TestRemoteBatchCloserRefusesANextClaim, TestRemoteBatchCloserValidatesANextClaimFirst and TestRemoteReadyClaimerReportsLostRaces were red on S6c before this change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(externaldeps): unassigned claim-next and fail-closed close reads Review fixes for the S6c composition against a server that does not advertise policy.external_dependencies: the two majors of review attempt 1, plus the minors on the same code. - ReadyClaimer: the composed claim-next reads only open, unassigned ready rows (Unassigned=true, Assignee cleared), the candidates the local ClaimReadyIssueInTx selects. A row another actor holds, or one already assigned to the caller, is no longer taken or counted as a lost race. Each pass reads 25 candidates past the blocked rows, as httpclient's composed claim does, and a full window lost end to end is read once more: claimed rows leave the unassigned set. Only a claim that tried candidates and won none is an error. - BatchCloser: an externally blocked item travels to the server only when its status read finds it closed or not found (liveRefusal). Any other read error is that item's outcome, so a transient or auth failure no longer forwards a refused close to a server that will not refuse it. - TreeWalker: a failed capability probe renders the external leaves over the walked tree instead of failing a walk the server already answered. appendTreeExternalReferences skips an id the tree holds, so an enforcing server's own leaves are not doubled. - remoteEdges names each anchor once and skips an empty one, which the http EdgeReader refuses with ErrValidation. The composition fakes now honor Unassigned/Assignee as workapi.BuildReadyFilter does, model a rival claim landing first and a failing GetIssue, and refuse an empty edge anchor as httpclient does. New: TestRemoteReadyClaimerTakesOnlyUnassignedWork, TestRemoteReadyClaimerWalksAContendedFront, TestRemoteBatchCloserAnswersAFailedReadWithIt, TestRemoteEdgesNamesEachAnchorOnce, and the probe-failure cases of TestRemoteTreeWalkerAddsExternalLeaves. Each is red with its fix reverted. From review attempt 2, three nearby cleanups: - TestServedRolesKeepTheExternalDependencyPolicy seeds open rows held by another actor and by the claimant ahead of the free work, then claims with and without an assignee filter. The unassigned-only claim is now pinned over a real served server, not only through the fakes: red with the pre-fixup remote_roles.go, with filter.Unassigned dropped, and (the filtered claim) with an explicit assignee honored. - The capabilities description in openapi.v0.yaml (and the regenerated types.gen.go comment) no longer calls the whole list build-level: policy.external_dependencies depends on how the server composed its roles, as the paragraph above it says. - createbatchequiv's golden note names issueops.PreparePublicCreateRequest instead of a commit id that is not on this branch. Agent-Signature: claude-code-claude-opus-5-5-max on behalf of Julian Knutsen Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(backend/http): count a not_found read as reaching the remote in #7469's credential doors main's #7469 added TestExplicitCredentialIgnoresTheEnvPlaintextGrant. Its OpenWith and Open doors read bd-1 from plaintextRemote, which answers every issue read not_found, and the granted leg needs that read to return a nil error. That held while the http client answered a miss with (nil, nil). This branch's "fix(httpclient): GetIssue answers a miss with storage.ErrNotFound, like the local stores" makes the same read return storage.ErrNotFound. So on main plus this branch both doors fail at per_open_credential_test.go:392 ("with Target.AllowInsecureCredential: not found: issue bd-1") under plain go test. The merge is textually clean, so only a build of the merge shows it. The two store doors now count storage.ErrNotFound as success, since that answer came off the wire. The assertions are unchanged. The refused leg still needs the "refusing to send a credential" error and no request on the transport. The granted leg still needs exactly one request carrying "Bearer explicit-token": a granted read that never reaches the wire still fails at :408. Agent-Signature: claude-code-claude-opus-5-5-max on behalf of Julian Knutsen Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
444 lines
17 KiB
Go
444 lines
17 KiB
Go
package bdhttp_test
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// Written fresh for OSS beads S6f (no bd-enterprise source copied): one
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// process opening several projects, on the same server, each with its own
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// credential (gc's per-city / per-rig credentials).
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"net/url"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"testing"
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"github.com/steveyegge/beads/backend"
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bdhttp "github.com/steveyegge/beads/backend/http"
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"github.com/steveyegge/beads/internal/storage"
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"github.com/steveyegge/beads/internal/storage/backends"
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)
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// twoProjectServer is ONE bd serve stand-in (one host:port) mounting two
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// projects under their own path roots, recording the Authorization header
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// each project saw. The host:port ladder cannot tell the two apart; only a
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// per-open credential can.
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type twoProjectServer struct {
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*httptest.Server
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mu sync.Mutex
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auths map[string][]string // mount -> Authorization headers seen
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}
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func newTwoProjectServer(t *testing.T, mounts ...string) *twoProjectServer {
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t.Helper()
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s := &twoProjectServer{auths: map[string][]string{}}
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s.Server = httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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for _, mount := range mounts {
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if r.URL.Path != "/"+mount+"/v0/beads/context" {
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continue
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}
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s.mu.Lock()
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s.auths[mount] = append(s.auths[mount], r.Header.Get("Authorization"))
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s.mu.Unlock()
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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_, _ = w.Write([]byte(`{"api_version":"v0","backend":"dolt","bd_version":"9.9.9",` +
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`"beads_dir":"/srv/.beads","capabilities":["issues.get","issues.list"],` +
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`"database":"beads","dolt_mode":"server","project_id":"proj-` + mount + `","repo_root":"/srv",` +
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`"schema_version":1,"wire_revision":1,"min_client_wire_revision":1}`))
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return
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}
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http.NotFound(w, r)
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}))
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t.Cleanup(s.Server.Close)
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return s
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}
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func (s *twoProjectServer) target(t *testing.T, mount string) bdhttp.Target {
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t.Helper()
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base, err := url.Parse(s.URL + "/" + mount)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("parse the test server URL: %v", err)
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}
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return bdhttp.Target{BaseURL: base, ExpectProjectID: "proj-" + mount}
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}
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func (s *twoProjectServer) wantAuthorization(t *testing.T, mount, want string) {
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t.Helper()
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s.mu.Lock()
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defer s.mu.Unlock()
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got := s.auths[mount]
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if len(got) == 0 {
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t.Fatalf("project %q saw no requests at all", mount)
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}
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for i, auth := range got {
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if auth != want {
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t.Errorf("project %q request %d carried Authorization %q, want %q", mount, i, auth, want)
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}
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}
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}
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// poisonAmbient arms every ambient credential source for 127.0.0.1 with a
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// token that must never reach the wire: the env token, a token command, and a
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// credentials file section for the server's exact host:port.
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func poisonAmbient(t *testing.T, server *httptest.Server) {
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t.Helper()
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base, err := url.Parse(server.URL)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("parse the test server URL: %v", err)
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}
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t.Setenv(bdhttp.TokenEnv, "127.0.0.1=ambient-env-token")
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t.Setenv(bdhttp.TokenCommandEnv, "127.0.0.1=echo ambient-command-token")
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credFile := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "credentials")
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body := "[" + base.Host + "]\npassword = ambient-file-token\n"
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if err := os.WriteFile(credFile, []byte(body), 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("write credentials file: %v", err)
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}
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t.Setenv("BEADS_CREDENTIALS_FILE", credFile)
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}
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// TestTwoStoresOnOneHostEachSendTheirOwnToken is the G7 shape: one process,
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// one server (one host:port), two projects, two credentials. Each store must
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// send its own token on every request, and neither may pick up the other's
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// or the ambient one — through the direct door and the registry's OpenWith
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// seam alike.
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func TestTwoStoresOnOneHostEachSendTheirOwnToken(t *testing.T) {
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server := newTwoProjectServer(t, "alpha", "beta", "gamma", "delta")
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poisonAmbient(t, server.Server)
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ctx := context.Background()
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// The direct door: bdhttp.Open with Options.Credential.
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alpha, err := bdhttp.Open(ctx, server.target(t, "alpha"), bdhttp.Options{
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HTTPClient: server.Client(), Credential: &recordingProvider{token: "alpha-token"},
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Open alpha: %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = alpha.Close() })
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beta, err := bdhttp.Open(ctx, server.target(t, "beta"), bdhttp.Options{
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HTTPClient: server.Client(), Credential: &recordingProvider{token: "beta-token"},
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Open beta: %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = beta.Close() })
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// The registry seam: OpenWith with a ProvidedCredential per workspace.
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registerForTest(t, bdhttp.Options{HTTPClient: server.Client(), RequireCredential: true})
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registered, ok := backend.Lookup(backendName)
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if !ok {
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t.Fatal("the http backend is not registered")
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}
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openRegistered := func(mount, token string) backend.DoltStorage {
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t.Helper()
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beadsDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ".beads")
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if err := os.MkdirAll(beadsDir, 0o700); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("create workspace: %v", err)
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}
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if err := bdhttp.SaveTarget(beadsDir, server.target(t, mount)); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("save the activation sidecar: %v", err)
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}
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store, err := registered.OpenWith(ctx, beadsDir, backends.OpenOptions{
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Credential: bdhttp.ProvidedCredential{Provider: &recordingProvider{token: token}},
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("OpenWith %s: %v", mount, err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = store.Close() })
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return store
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}
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gamma := openRegistered("gamma", "gamma-token")
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delta := openRegistered("delta", "delta-token")
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// Interleave the reads so a credential cached per host by whichever open
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// ran first would show up on the others.
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for round := 0; round < 2; round++ {
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for name, store := range map[string]backend.DoltStorage{"alpha": alpha, "beta": beta, "gamma": gamma, "delta": delta} {
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got, err := store.GetMetadata(ctx, "_project_id")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("GetMetadata %s: %v", name, err)
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}
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if got != "proj-"+name {
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t.Errorf("store %s reached project %q", name, got)
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}
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}
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}
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for _, mount := range []string{"alpha", "beta", "gamma", "delta"} {
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server.wantAuthorization(t, mount, "Bearer "+mount+"-token")
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}
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}
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// TestExplicitCredentialOverridesTheAmbientToken: with BEADS_HTTP_TOKEN,
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// BEADS_HTTP_TOKEN_COMMAND and the credentials file all naming this server,
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// an explicit Options.Credential is still the only thing sent. The control
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// open without one proves the poison is live (the ambient ladder does pick
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// it up), so the explicit result is not a vacuous pass.
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func TestExplicitCredentialOverridesTheAmbientToken(t *testing.T) {
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server := newTwoProjectServer(t, "alpha", "beta")
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poisonAmbient(t, server.Server)
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ctx := context.Background()
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store, err := bdhttp.Open(ctx, server.target(t, "alpha"), bdhttp.Options{
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HTTPClient: server.Client(), Credential: &recordingProvider{token: "explicit-token"},
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})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Open: %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = store.Close() })
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if _, err := store.GetMetadata(ctx, "_project_id"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("GetMetadata: %v", err)
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}
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server.wantAuthorization(t, "alpha", "Bearer explicit-token")
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control, err := bdhttp.Open(ctx, server.target(t, "beta"), bdhttp.Options{HTTPClient: server.Client()})
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Open (ambient control): %v", err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = control.Close() })
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if _, err := control.GetMetadata(ctx, "_project_id"); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("GetMetadata (ambient control): %v", err)
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}
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server.wantAuthorization(t, "beta", "Bearer ambient-env-token")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestExplicitCredentialSurvivesBrokenAmbientEnv is the behavioural proof
|
|
// that the explicit door reads no environment: every ambient variable it
|
|
// could consult is set to a value the ambient path refuses outright (an
|
|
// unscoped token, an unscoped CA pattern), and the explicit open and
|
|
// handshake still succeed. The control shows the same env does break an
|
|
// ambient handshake.
|
|
func TestExplicitCredentialSurvivesBrokenAmbientEnv(t *testing.T) {
|
|
server := newTwoProjectServer(t, "alpha")
|
|
t.Setenv(bdhttp.TokenEnv, "unscoped-token-is-refused")
|
|
t.Setenv(bdhttp.TokenCommandEnv, "unscoped-command-is-refused")
|
|
t.Setenv("BEADS_HTTP_CA_FILE", "/no/such/ca.pem")
|
|
t.Setenv("BEADS_CREDENTIALS_FILE", filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "absent"))
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
opts := bdhttp.Options{HTTPClient: server.Client(), Credential: &recordingProvider{token: "explicit-token"}}
|
|
|
|
if _, err := bdhttp.Handshake(ctx, server.target(t, "alpha"), opts); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Handshake with a Credential consulted the broken ambient env: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
store, err := bdhttp.Open(ctx, server.target(t, "alpha"), opts)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Open with a Credential: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = store.Close() })
|
|
if _, err := store.GetMetadata(ctx, "_project_id"); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("GetMetadata with a Credential consulted the broken ambient env: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
server.wantAuthorization(t, "alpha", "Bearer explicit-token")
|
|
|
|
if _, err := bdhttp.Handshake(ctx, server.target(t, "alpha"), bdhttp.Options{HTTPClient: server.Client()}); err == nil {
|
|
t.Fatal("the ambient handshake succeeded under a malformed unscoped token; the control no longer proves anything")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestHandshakeWithACredential: the pre-connect probe authorizes with the
|
|
// credential it is handed, not the ambient ladder, so it verifies exactly
|
|
// what the tenant's store will send.
|
|
func TestHandshakeWithACredential(t *testing.T) {
|
|
server := newTwoProjectServer(t, "alpha")
|
|
poisonAmbient(t, server.Server)
|
|
provider := &recordingProvider{token: "probe-token"}
|
|
|
|
snapshot, err := bdhttp.Handshake(context.Background(), server.target(t, "alpha"), bdhttp.Options{
|
|
HTTPClient: server.Client(), Credential: provider,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Handshake: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if snapshot.ProjectID != "proj-alpha" {
|
|
t.Errorf("snapshot project = %q, want proj-alpha", snapshot.ProjectID)
|
|
}
|
|
server.wantAuthorization(t, "alpha", "Bearer probe-token")
|
|
provider.mu.Lock()
|
|
calls := provider.calls
|
|
provider.mu.Unlock()
|
|
if calls == 0 {
|
|
t.Error("the handshake never asked the supplied provider to authorize")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// plaintextRemote stands in for a bd serve reached over plain http at a
|
|
// non-loopback address (the TLS-terminating proxy a plaintext grant exists
|
|
// for) without opening a socket. It answers the handshake, and not_found for
|
|
// anything else, and records the Authorization header of every request that
|
|
// actually reached it.
|
|
type plaintextRemote struct {
|
|
mu sync.Mutex
|
|
auths []string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (r *plaintextRemote) RoundTrip(req *http.Request) (*http.Response, error) {
|
|
if req.Body != nil {
|
|
_ = req.Body.Close()
|
|
}
|
|
r.mu.Lock()
|
|
r.auths = append(r.auths, req.Header.Get("Authorization"))
|
|
r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
status, contentType, body := http.StatusNotFound, "application/problem+json", `{"status":404,"code":"not_found"}`
|
|
if strings.HasSuffix(req.URL.Path, "/v0/beads/context") {
|
|
status, contentType = http.StatusOK, "application/json"
|
|
body = `{"api_version":"v0","backend":"dolt","bd_version":"9.9.9",` +
|
|
`"beads_dir":"/srv/.beads","capabilities":["issues.get"],` +
|
|
`"database":"beads","dolt_mode":"server","project_id":"proj-remote","repo_root":"/srv",` +
|
|
`"schema_version":1,"wire_revision":1,"min_client_wire_revision":1}`
|
|
}
|
|
return &http.Response{
|
|
StatusCode: status,
|
|
Header: http.Header{"Content-Type": {contentType}},
|
|
Body: io.NopCloser(strings.NewReader(body)),
|
|
ContentLength: -1,
|
|
Request: req,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (r *plaintextRemote) seen() []string {
|
|
r.mu.Lock()
|
|
defer r.mu.Unlock()
|
|
return append([]string(nil), r.auths...)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestExplicitCredentialIgnoresTheEnvPlaintextGrant pins, at each production
|
|
// door, that BEADS_HTTP_ALLOW_INSECURE=1 grants an explicit credential
|
|
// nothing. Against a plain-http, non-loopback target, the registry's OpenWith
|
|
// (ProvidedCredential), Open and Handshake (Options.Credential) each refuse
|
|
// before any request reaches the transport, and the refusal names the grant
|
|
// that does work there. Every other explicit-door test dials loopback, where
|
|
// the guard returns before it reads the variable, so a door reverted to the
|
|
// env-consulting DialWith passed them all.
|
|
//
|
|
// Each door's control differs from its refused leg only in
|
|
// Target.AllowInsecureCredential, and must send the explicit token exactly
|
|
// once. The ambient control shows the same environment does grant the
|
|
// built-in ladder plaintext, so the refusals are the door's doing and not a
|
|
// variable nobody reads.
|
|
func TestExplicitCredentialIgnoresTheEnvPlaintextGrant(t *testing.T) {
|
|
hermeticEnv(t)
|
|
t.Setenv("BEADS_HTTP_ALLOW_INSECURE", "1")
|
|
registerForTest(t, bdhttp.Options{})
|
|
registered, ok := backend.Lookup(backendName)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
t.Fatal("the http backend is not registered")
|
|
}
|
|
ctx := context.Background()
|
|
remote, err := url.Parse("http://198.51.100.1/") // RFC 5737 TEST-NET-2: never dialed.
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("parse the remote URL: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
doors := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
// call drives one request through the door with a fresh explicit
|
|
// credential and returns that request's error. plaintextRemote
|
|
// answers the issue read not_found, which GetIssue reports as
|
|
// storage.ErrNotFound; that request reached the remote, so the
|
|
// store doors count it as success.
|
|
call func(t *testing.T, target bdhttp.Target, client *http.Client) error
|
|
}{
|
|
{"OpenWith", func(t *testing.T, target bdhttp.Target, client *http.Client) error {
|
|
beadsDir := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), ".beads")
|
|
if err := os.MkdirAll(beadsDir, 0o700); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("create workspace: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if err := bdhttp.SaveTarget(beadsDir, target); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("save the activation sidecar: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
store, err := registered.OpenWith(ctx, beadsDir, backends.OpenOptions{
|
|
Credential: bdhttp.ProvidedCredential{Provider: &recordingProvider{token: "explicit-token"}},
|
|
HTTPClient: client,
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("OpenWith: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = store.Close() })
|
|
if _, err = store.GetIssue(ctx, "bd-1"); errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return err
|
|
}},
|
|
{"Open", func(t *testing.T, target bdhttp.Target, client *http.Client) error {
|
|
store, err := bdhttp.Open(ctx, target, bdhttp.Options{
|
|
HTTPClient: client, Credential: &recordingProvider{token: "explicit-token"},
|
|
})
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Open: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = store.Close() })
|
|
if _, err = store.GetIssue(ctx, "bd-1"); errors.Is(err, storage.ErrNotFound) {
|
|
return nil
|
|
}
|
|
return err
|
|
}},
|
|
{"Handshake", func(t *testing.T, target bdhttp.Target, client *http.Client) error {
|
|
_, err := bdhttp.Handshake(ctx, target, bdhttp.Options{
|
|
HTTPClient: client, Credential: &recordingProvider{token: "explicit-token"},
|
|
})
|
|
return err
|
|
}},
|
|
}
|
|
for _, door := range doors {
|
|
t.Run(door.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
refused := &plaintextRemote{}
|
|
err := door.call(t, bdhttp.Target{BaseURL: remote}, &http.Client{Transport: refused})
|
|
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refusing to send a credential") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("got %v, want the plaintext refusal: BEADS_HTTP_ALLOW_INSECURE=1 must grant an explicit credential nothing", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if msg := err.Error(); strings.Contains(msg, "BEADS_HTTP_ALLOW_INSECURE") || !strings.Contains(msg, "Target.AllowInsecureCredential") {
|
|
t.Errorf("refusal %q must name Target.AllowInsecureCredential, the grant this door honors, and not BEADS_HTTP_ALLOW_INSECURE, which it never reads", msg)
|
|
}
|
|
if got := refused.seen(); len(got) != 0 {
|
|
t.Errorf("the transport saw %d request(s) %q; the refusal must stop the credential before the wire", len(got), got)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
granted := &plaintextRemote{}
|
|
if err := door.call(t, bdhttp.Target{BaseURL: remote, AllowInsecureCredential: true}, &http.Client{Transport: granted}); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("with Target.AllowInsecureCredential: %v", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if got := granted.seen(); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "Bearer explicit-token" {
|
|
t.Errorf("with Target.AllowInsecureCredential the transport saw %q, want one request carrying the explicit token", got)
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Control: the same environment does grant the built-in ladder plaintext.
|
|
t.Setenv(bdhttp.TokenEnv, "198.51.100.1=ambient-token")
|
|
ambient := &plaintextRemote{}
|
|
if _, err := bdhttp.Handshake(ctx, bdhttp.Target{BaseURL: remote}, bdhttp.Options{HTTPClient: &http.Client{Transport: ambient}}); err != nil {
|
|
t.Fatalf("ambient Handshake under BEADS_HTTP_ALLOW_INSECURE=1: %v; the control no longer shows the variable is live", err)
|
|
}
|
|
if got := ambient.seen(); len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "Bearer ambient-token" {
|
|
t.Errorf("the ambient Handshake sent %q, want one request carrying the ambient token", got)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestRegisterRefusesAProcessWideCredential: the registered dialer serves
|
|
// every workspace in the process, so a credential on it would be one
|
|
// credential for every tenant — exactly what Options.Credential is for
|
|
// avoiding. Register panics before touching the registry.
|
|
func TestRegisterRefusesAProcessWideCredential(t *testing.T) {
|
|
hermeticEnv(t)
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if backend.Registered(backendName) {
|
|
backend.Deregister(backendName)
|
|
t.Error("the refused Register still put http in the registry")
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
var msg string
|
|
func() {
|
|
defer func() {
|
|
if r := recover(); r != nil {
|
|
msg, _ = r.(string)
|
|
}
|
|
}()
|
|
bdhttp.Register(bdhttp.Options{Credential: &recordingProvider{token: "global"}})
|
|
}()
|
|
if !strings.Contains(msg, "per open") {
|
|
t.Fatalf("Register with a Credential did not panic with the per-open refusal (got %q)", msg)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|