Add strict security validation for remote URLs and remote names to prevent
injection attacks when multi-remote support lands.
Changes:
- Add ValidateRemoteURL() with control character rejection, CLI flag
injection prevention, scheme allowlist, and per-scheme structural
validation (host/path requirements)
- Add ValidateRemoteName() aligned with existing peer-name policy
(letter-start, alphanumeric + hyphen/underscore, max 64 chars)
- Add MatchesRemotePattern() and ValidateRemoteURLWithPatterns() for
enterprise lockdown via federation.allowed-remote-patterns config
- Move config validation from simple IsRemoteURL() classifier to strict
ValidateRemoteURL() security boundary
- Add defense-in-depth validation in AddCLIRemote/RemoveCLIRemote
- Add validation at clone entry points (cache.Ensure, bootstrap)
- Tighten SCP-style URL regex to exclude control characters in path
- Add comprehensive test coverage for null bytes, control chars,
newline injection, CLI flag injection, scheme validation, structural
validation, remote name edge cases, and pattern matching
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>